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ABSTRACT
Since World War II, the American balance-of-payments 
situation has presented a multifaceted problem. This study is 
an attempt to show some of the interrelated and overlapping 
political, economic, military and diplomatic aspects of this 
problem. Of the key factors involved, international trade and 
foreign aid programs have been of primary significance. Pro­
posed solutions, however, have reflected highly diverse opinion 
on both the national and international levels.
No immediate resolution to the problem has emerged, 
partly because of the democratic system of government in the 
United States and partly because of the limited reforms which 
have been agreed to in the international monetary system. It 
is not expected that this problem will be solved easily or 
quickly for two reasons. First, the failure to curb adequately 
domestic inflation has reduced American competitiveness in 
world markets, and, secondly, a continuing commitment to the 
foreign aid program has been made.
Finally, recurring crises in the future are a very real 
possibility. Given the complexity of the problem, however, 
careful deliberation and experimentation seem warranted even at 




In the period following World War II, foreign finance ha 
assumed an increasingly controversial and political role in the 
process of American foreign policy determination. Prior to this 
period, the subject of international economics had been super­
seded by such immediately critical and pressing concerns as the 
conduct of world war; postwar recovery of the combatants, prin­
cipally Western Europe and Japan; and, the resumption of hos­
tilities in the form of the Cold War. International relations 
in the earlier part of the post-World War II period, therefore, 
were primarily conducted on the basis of political inclinations 
and alignments, while economic policy served as an adjunct.
Relegating economic considerations to an auxiliary role, 
however, ignored the economic trauma of the 1930Ts. That eco­
nomic crisis, unfortunately, did not result in significant inter 
national monetary reform. With the outbreak of war, followed by 
high production levels, and, finally, economic assistance pro­
grams inaugurated to reestablish economic stability throughout 
the Western countries, the need for such reform was overshadowed
With the recovery of Western Europe, economic competi­
tiveness necessarily resulted. Concurrently, the United States 
had become involved in a continuing global program of foreign
1
2
economic assistance. While recognizing the capabilities and po­
tentialities of a highly developed and internationally competi­
tive country, the complexities of maintaining this competitiveness 
and administering a foreign aid program have created an economic 
problem with such strong political overtones and implications 
that it touches upon domestic as well as foreign policy; the role 
of government as well as the responsibility of industry; and, the 
challenge to American leadership from the recovered Western 
European countries as well as Communist countries of the world.
This economic problem which touches upon so many aspects 
of domestic as well as foreign policy was acknowledged only after 
it had independently manifested itself, thereby requiring a reso­
lution. Since 1958, this economic problem has been known as the 
American balance-of-payments problem. In 1958, the United States 
of America experienced for the first time in the post-World 
War II era, a deficit rather than a surplus in its international 
transactions. Consequently, economists, government officials, 
and many laymen became virtually obsessed with the balance-of- 
payments problem, and created a proliferation of studies and 
proposed solutions. Public and governmental response to the 
continuous debate and publicity surrounding this deficit, and 
the apparent difficulty in correcting or altering it, has been 
one of confusion, fear, and, in general, concern for an effective 
means of returning the United States to its former economic role, 
that of a creditor rather than a debtor nation.
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Such a position of being a creditor as opposed to a 
debtor nation was accompanied by a certain degree of economic 
prestige, thus implying recognition of the strength of the Amer­
ican currency. Furthermore, this strong position allowed the 
differentiation if not, indeed, the divorce of domestic and in­
ternational economic policy considerations. Therefore, these 
two areas could, and did for a time, remain separate without the 
exaction of political damages.
With the decline and fall of the American dollar, how­
ever, both these advantages have been altered. While prolonged 
and unchallenged economic leadership could not have been realis­
tically expected in any case, vestiges of temporary preeminence 
have endured. These are reflected in attitudes toward the flow 
of capital, unquestioning confidence in the dollar, export and 
import policies, and, particularly, policies which affect price 
levels, employment, and internal growth. In other words, there 
has been a decided reluctance to acknowledge and deal effectively 
with the connection and interaction between foreign and domestic 
economic policy.
The advent of a deficit, accompanied by a loss of un­
challenged international prestige, has shaken this blind faith 
in the immortality of the American dollar. Furthermore, during 
the past decade, it has become increasingly apparent that the 
United States cannot easily, if indeed it can at all, return to 
its former position of unchallenged economic leadership. While 
a number oF complex issues are in part responsible for this
4
relative decline, two areas, those of international trade and 
foreign aid, both economic and military, have been very signifi­
cant in creating the present situation.
In the area of trade, the United States has been increas­
ingly challenged by the recovery and emergence of both Western 
Europe and Japan. Although this recovery was intended, and, in 
fact, considerably aided by the United States, certain accom­
panying effects were not. These include substantial and con­
tinued foreign investments, short-term capital loans, and the 
transference of technological expertise. In addition, conflicting 
domestic policies have also contributed to the decline of the 
United States trade position in relation to that of other indus­
trial nations.
In contrast to the declining position in international 
trade, America, since the close of World War II, has steadily 
increased its commitment to a foreign aid program without any 
other serious contenders for leadership in the Western world.
From the recovery of Western Europe, America turned to the Third 
World. This action was largely in response to Russia’s emergence 
from World War II as a powerful and apparently serious competitor 
for world leadership in whatever areas possible. Furthermore, 
this competition was increasingly reflected not only in the 
militaristic armaments race, but also in the economic assistance 
contest. Such ideological competition between communism and 
capitalism aimed at winning over underdeveloped countries has 
spawned a form of hostility referred to as economic warfare.
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The expense and emphasis on this warfare has, necessarily, af­
fected the American balance~of-pa.yments problem.
On the other hand, the fundamental question regarding 
both trade and aid seems to be, how significant is this deficit 
in relation to the balance of payments, considering the strength 
and potential of America's national economy? Is it really only 
one abstraction among many which must be weighed as such? Or, 
can retaining confidence in the dollar actually be translated 
and demonstrated in concrete causes and effects?
To answer these questions, the relationship between the 
goals of domestic policy and those of foreign policy must be 
recognized. With the international leadership role which the 
United States has assumed, foreign and domestic decisions can no 
longer be differentiated, for the one directly affects the other. 
Therefore, the balance-of-payments deficit, which has received 
much attention both politically and economically in the 1960Ts, 
must be viewed as both a national and an international problem, 
mutually inclusive.
Consequently, this dollar crisis, if in fact it is a. 
crisis, must necessarily be dealt with on both economic and 
political levels. In short, choices and alternatives must be 
explained as a. prerequisite to deciding priorities and insuring 
general public acceptance.
Prior to discussing current choices and alternatives, 
however, there is a need for historical perspective. In com­
parison to and unlike European countries, the United States is
G
experiencing a balance-of-payments problem only as a recent 
phenomenon. For the period following the economic crisis of the 
early 1930’s until the late 1950’s, universal acceptance of the 
dollar was unquestioned. During this period, then, neither the 
balance of payments nor the international monetary system was of 
particular interest or concern to the American public. This 
international strength of the dollar, however, actually helped 
to precipitate the deficit which first appeared in 1958.
What, then, preceded and culminated in the climactic 
year of 1958? The answer to this question dates hack to the 
close of World War II. At that time, Western Europe was eco­
nomically prostrate. America, in contrast, represented economic 
security and stability. Consequently, large outflows of gold 
moved from Western Europe to the United States. Not only were 
these outflows encouraged by the strength of the dollar, hut also 
by the United States’ extensive transactions with the rest of the 
world.
Following World War II, the demand for American products 
appeared to he unquenchable. Furthermore, only two currencies, 
the dollar and the Swiss franc, could be converted into any other 
national currency upon demand because currencies other than these 
two were hampered by the complications of numerous exchange con­
trols. ' Therefore, America was not only catapulted into world
 ̂James Tobin, National Economic Pol-icy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1966), p. 187.
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economic leadership by the ruin of Western Europe, but also
obtained possession of the largest supply of gold among the
Western nations, and achieved the distinction of being a leader
in world export production. It was this latter condition, rooted
in the seemingly insatiable appetite of foreign countries for
United States products, services, and securities, that may have
insured the value of the dollar far more than an over-abundant 
2gold supply.
Under these circumstances, supplemented by efficient 
financial organization in the United States, the dollar grew into 
a reserve currency. While gold remained the primary asset, dol­
lars became increasingly popular in place of, or in combination 
with, gold. Essentially, two reasons explain why the monetary 
authorities of countries hold international reserves. These are 
for precautionary and for transactional motives. As a precau­
tionary motive, reserves are held to insure the finance of tem­
porary balance-of-payments deficits. This strategy allows more 
flexibility in making adjustments, as well as more independent 
domestic policies. The second reason or transaction motive stems 
from the fact that some means must exist and be recognized os 
acceptable payment for international transactions. In the pogt- 
World War II period, the dollar increasingly became a most
Tobin, National Econom ie Policy, p. 1H7.2
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acceptable international currency as a result of the transaction 
motive.
Among the reasons for this transformation of the dollar 
into international currency were the benefits of interest which 
the dollar could earn; the products and services which the dollar 
commanded; and, the convenience of acceptability and convert­
ibility in both foreign exchange markets and the United States 
Treasury. Moreover, this transformation was attributable to an 
uncompetitive and prostrate European market looking to America 
for products and services, and having the implicit understanding 
that accumulated dollars could be converted into gold upon de­
mand.
How, then, did uncompetitive Western Europe again become 
competitive and, subsequently, manage to accumulate dollars?
Since economic recovery prefigured competitiveness, the means of 
that recovery becomes significant. That means was provided by 
the United States in the form of direct assistance. From 19M-6 to 
1958, $80 billion was made available to Western Europe, two- 
thirds of which was expended for economic recovery and one-third 
for defense purposes.'1
While some loss in the relative international economic 
position of the United States realistically must have been
-^Robert II. Heller, "The Transactions Demand for inter­
national Means of Payment,” The Journal of Political Economy, 
LXXVI (January/Fcbruary, 1908), IMS.
*Seymour E. Harris, ed., The Dollar in Ur is is (New York: 
Hnreourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1901), p . 0.
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expected with the recovery of Western Europe and Japan, the con­
tinued monetary difficulties and implications arising therefrom 
seem not to have been anticipated. Rather, these difficulties 
have evoked responses ranging from alarm to dismay. The general 
concern at the national level has centered around the idea that 
continued deficits allow increasingly heavy claims against the 
American economy. Since these claims link domestic policy deci­
sions to balance-of-payments considerations and, thereby, limit 
independence and freedom of action, the conclusion reached is 
that these deficits not only should not but cannot continue.
The underlying fear accompanying this conclusion is that should 
claims be withdrawn, serious complications would arise which 
could undermine the entire foreign policy program as well as 
America's international economic position.-’
In conjunction with these considerations, steady pro­
gress and sustained full employment at the domestic level have 
become and remain an equally perplexing concern. The very exis­
tence of the deficit is capable of and may serve to encourage 
the advocation of and adherence to a stringently conservative 
domestic policy. As justification for the elimination of the 
deficit, in the extreme, policies resulting in a state of semi­
depression could conceivably he proposed and applied. While 
such policies might be acceptable to some, including those
’John Kenneth Galbraith, "Some Thoughts on Public Policy 
and the Dollar Problem," in The Dollar in Crisis, ed. by Seymour 
E. Harris (New York: harcourt, brace and World, Inc., IDOL),
p. 00.
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holders of liquid assets throughout the world, the feasibility 
and acquiescence on the national level is highly questionable and 
certainly politically controversial, as well as detrimental.
On the other hand, some domestic policies, notably those 
which have acceded to and, in some cases, accelerated inflation, 
have certainly had an adverse effect on the balance-of-payments 
status. This is particularly applicable to the competitive 
position of American products in the world market. Domestic 
inflation which raises prices necessarily lowers competitiveness 
abroad, unless a comparable degree of inflation exists abroad. 
Therefore, it has become increasingly difficult, if not impos­
sible, to consider domestic economic policies as separate and 
divorced from foreign economic policies. Instead, both must be 
considered in the broader context of the American payments and 
gold reserves situation. In this broader context, any viable 
and enduring solution, or partial solution, to the balance-of- 
payments problem would necessitate cooperation and coordination, 
or nationalization of policy in the broadest sense: econom­
ically, politically/diplomatically, and militarily.
CHAPTER II
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
For the two areas of international trade and foreign 
economic assistance, the balance-of-payments problem has partic­
ular political significance. This significance is derived from 
the fact that the downward trend in the unique, yet temporary, 
American trade position began almost as soon as Western European 
recovery materialized. This recovery coincided with the upward 
trend in foreign aid expenditures. Therefore, Western Europe’s 
recovery, as it became a virtual certainty, caused the superi­
ority of the United States inevitably to diminish, and the eco­
nomic gap between the two areas was quickly being closed.
Tangible evidence of the closing gap appeared first in 
the reversal of capital movements. As this reversal increasingly 
favored Western Europe 5 a. fearful reaction was elicited in the 
United States, accompanied by numerous warnings about gold losses 
and loss of confidence in the dollar. As a result, growing 
opposition to expansionary domestic policies appeared. Another 
concern repeatedly voiced was that America was pricing itself 
out of the world markets because of domestic inflation.
As a further complication, American inflation was being 
confronted by the rapid economic growth of Western Europe and 
Japan. These countries were said to be exercising and being
11
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stimulated by sound, orthodox financial practices."*" In other 
words, inflation in those countries was restrained by government 
planning and policy, which thereby improved the individual 
country’s overall competitiveness.
In contrast, alternative means were sought in the United 
States. While a more equitable distribution of gold reserves 
was desired internationally, the continued drain in the post- 
World War II period was considered highly undesirable, and a 
solution to curtail it was avidly sought. One alternative means 
of offsetting a reversal in capital movements would require the 
United States to increase substantially the material exported 
over that imported. Successful accomplishment, however, would 
be presupposed by a favorably competitive trade position, which, 
in turn, would relate to price, thus completing the circle and 
returning to the domestic inflation issue.
An example of this cycle would be the case of the Amer­
ican steel industry. With the wage-price syndrome in the steel
industry, American prices are said to have become uncompetitive
2and, hence, markets have been lost both abroad and at home. 
Secondary effects would include the weakening of the position of 
other products, thereby multiplying the problems of the dollar 
dilemma.
■^Gottfried Uabcrlcr, "Domestic Economic Policies and the 
United States Balance of Payments," in The Dollar in Crisis, cd. 
by Seymour E. Harris (New York: Ilarcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 
1961), p. 71.
^John Kenneth Galbraith, "Some Thoughts ori Public Policy 
and the Dollar Problem," in Harris, The Dollar in Crisis, p. 90.
Conversely, the United States steel industry justifies 
cost increase on the very grounds of insuring the competitive 
trade position of the United States. The industry asserts that 
machinery and equipment provide the means by which competition, 
the base of the United States trade position, is maintained. 
Therefore, this machinery and equipment must be continually 
modernized, which consequently necessitates continuous expense. 
Table I reflects the steady increase resulting from this practice.
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TABLE 1
BUSINESS EXPENDITURES FOR NEW PLANT AND EQUIPMENT 
CALENDAR YEARS 1945-1968, INCLUSIVE 
(Millions)
Year Total Year Total
1945 .............  $ 8,69 2 1957 .............  $36,962
1946 ........... . 14'848 1958 .............  30'526
1947 .............  20*612 1959 .............  32*543
1948 .............  22* 059 1960 .............  35'680
1949 .............  19'285 1961 .............  34*370
1950 ............ . 20'605 1962 .............  37 *310
1951 .............  25'644 1963 .............  39'220
3 952 .............. 26'493 1964 .............  44,900
1953 .............  28'322 1965 .............  51*960
3 954 .............  26'827 3966 .............  60*630
1955 .............  28'701 1967 .............  61*660
1956 .............  35'081 1968 .............  65*230
Source: Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics
and Securities Exchange Commission, Facts and Figures 
on Government Finance (New York: Tax Foundation, 
Inc., 1969), p. 49.
This modernization expense is, in turn, passed on to the 
market through absorption in the sale price of the final pro­
duct. Attempts to modify this practice through the reduction or
stabilization of prices have resulted in the outcry that "no 
sales will be made, no work /will be/ provided, no taxes /will 
be mode/ available, and /the/ international competitive position, 
/the/ balance-of -payments, /the/ gold reserves, and /the./ na­
tional growth /of the United States/ will seriously suffer."^ 
While these claims represent the extreme position, the rationale 
behind retaining this practice was said to have been given cre­
dence and support in earlier statements by Secretary of the 
Treasury Douglas Dillon, speaking before the American Bankers 
Association. He is quoted as saying
More rapid equipment modernization by industry is vital 
to the success of our efforts to remain competitive in world 
markets and to achieve the rate of growth needed to assure 
us prosperity and reasonably full employment.1̂
While the significance of modernization may be and seemingly is 
crucial to our competitiveness, it does not seem to follow nec­
essarily that prices should be increased. Rather, Mr. Dillon 
intended that emphasis should be placed on devoting a larger 
percentage of our gross national product to this task without 
contributing to the wage-price spiral.
While the conflict of opinion over inflation has by no 
means been resolved, the steel industry serves as one illustra­
tion of the interaction between, and the inseparability of, 
foreign and domestic policy in the balance-of-payments problem.
14
%oger Blaugh, "Defense of the Steel Price Increase," in 
Problems of the Modern Economy, ed. by Edmund S. Phelps (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1DGG) , p. 46.
111 b id
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The question, then, becomes, how competitive is the United 
States? To what degree has the country’s position declined in­
ternationally? Since this subject has been frequently debated 
and conflicting reports offered, it should be pointed out that 
any conclusion does seem to rest on the particular time selected 
for study.
One study in this area has concluded, on the basis of a 
comparison between over 200 consumer goods representing 2,MOO 
product brands, excluding automobiles, that for the period 1950 
through 196b, the ’’competitiveness of American consumer goods 
/in the domestic market/ deteriorated during the 1950’s but 
stabilized after 1960. In foreign markets, however, our position 
has sharply deteriorated since 1960.”  ̂ Other factors were con­
sidered which also enter into such a comparison, such as quality, 
tariffs, and transportation costs.
In spite of this sharp deterioration, however, there ap­
pears to be the possibility of increased demand for consumer 
goods. This study also found that the countries of Western 
Europe, and especially those belonging to the Common Market, 
appear to be bordering upon a consumer goods boom reminiscent of 
that which occurred in the United States in the early postwar 
period and lasted through the 1950’s.^ Such a boom, again,
-’John J. Arena, ” Is the United States Pricing Itself 
Out of World Markets?”, in The Dollar Dol'ici!: Cause's and Curt’s, 
ed. by II. Peter Gray (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1967), p. M7.
(l Ibid. , p. MS.
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would profit the United States only if its products were compet­
itive price-wise, while simultaneously offering higher quality 
and better innovation. Such assets, however, have been of more 
benefit in selling such products as specialized machinery, new 
chemical products and aircraft equipment. These products ac­
count in large part for our trade surplus.'' Consumer products, 
therefore, appear to have been less competitive for a number of 
years, but could possibly increase significantly in the future.
While it can be argued that America’s overall competi­
tive position is basically strong, perhaps the relevant question 
is whether this position is strong enough. In 196b, exports of 
goods and services totaled $36.5 billion, reaching a summit for
Othis country and all others as well. Concurrently, imports 
paralleled the rise in gross national product. By United States 
Treasury definition, however, the commercial surplus has grown 
from $3.7 billion in 1960 to $5.9 billion in 196b.^ These fig­
ures, then, do not depict America’s competitive position as 
either weak or deteriorating. Instead, they might be inter­
preted as confirmation that prices and underlying prices, i.e., 
costs, have been unquestionably competitive as demonstrated by
^John J. Arena, "Is the United States Pricing Itself Out 
of World Markets?," in Gray, The Dollar Deficit: Causes and 
Cures, p. 52.
ORichard N. Cooper, "The United States Competitive 
Position— A .1965 Appraisal,” in The Dollar Def icit: Causes and 
Cures, ed. by II. Peter Gray (Boston: U. C. Heath and Co., 1967), 
p. 37.
^ l h i d  , p .  3 7 .
17
Americans excellent performance. Moreover, while inflation has 
been a. problem in the United States, it certainly has plagued 
foreign countries as well. Furthermore, inflation will most 
likely continue to confront the economics of other industrial 
nations in the future.
Despite seemingly we11-documented assertions that Amer­
ica’s trade position is sound and its relative competitiveness 
strong, the harassing question is whether it is strong enough to 
meet the country’s widespread financial commitments abroad.
Such ability necessitates that exports exceed imports to the 
degree that a surplus large enough to cover foreign commitments 
is provided. If meeting these commitments results in a continued 
deficit, the question appears to hinge upon the depth of the 
deficit, or
how large a deficit in its overall balance-of-payments the 
United States can or should run to provide the necessary 
liquidity for growth in world trade, without at the same 
time jeopardizing the international exchange standard.-^
Therefore, maintaining or increasing the export surplus would
involve several goals, some of which might come into conflict,
but all of ' iiich would fundamentally relate to the continuation
of international financial assistance.
Beyond national concern, there also exists the contin­
uing concern of other industrial and underdeveloped countries 
regarding the export surplus of the United States. In
^Richard N. Cooper, ’’The United States Competitive 
Posit:ion--A 1005 Appraisal," In Cray, The Dollar lie Pic i t:
Causes and Cures, p. Dl.
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comparison to many of them, America, with the realization of a. 
significant export surplus, is in a weak position to argue that 
it needs an increase the most. Moreover, the United States may 
be confronted by the resistance and resentment of other nations. 
Their reactions could take the form of countermeasures to im­
prove their own exports comparable to American efforts, lack of 
cooperation in reducing the existing trade barriers, and possibly 
even the application of new trade barriers. In short, equilib­
rium or even limitation of the American balance-of-payments de­
ficit is confronted by complex, overlapping considerations in 
both areas.
Similar to the balance-of-payments problem is the inter- 
relationship between trade and aid, which also is a recent 
phenomenon. It is additionally complicated by America’s lack of 
experience in foreign aid. The shambles of World War II elevatec 
the United States not only to a position of leadership in inter­
national trade, but also in Western defense. In this new role, 
America changed places with Western Europe and assumed the re­
sponsibilities for both foreign economic and defense aid. At 
the close of the war, the United States became the protector of 
Western Europe rather than being implicitly under the protection 
of Western Europe. The general situation which has resulted was 
summed up in a. policy statement by President John F. Kennedy in 
1961:
The surplus of our exports over our imports, while 
substantial, has not been large enough to cover our
19
expenditures for U.S. military establishments abroad, for 
capital invested abroad by private American businesses., and 
for government economic assistance and loan programs.^
The over-expanded expenditures, then, have developed not only
from Government assistance and defense programs, but also from
private investment.
Since the close of the war, government expenditures and 
private investment, though reduced, have continued despite the 
fact that Western Europe and Japan are considered recovered.
These expenses, plus the flow of capital away from the United 
States have adversely affected the balance-of-payments situation. 
These expenses, however, have not been limited to Western Europe 
and Japan. Rather, a splintering effect has taken place which 
now encompasses a sizeable number of countries throughout the 
world. The explanation of this development has been that Amer­
ica, while nursing Western Europe back to economic health, 
shouldered the former security responsibilities of Western 
Europe throughout the world. Considering the complications and 
difficulties inherent in these responsibilities, in addition to 
the expense, it has not been surprising that Western Europe be­
came extremely reluctant to undertake any further involvement as 
long as the United States was adequately meeting the task.
During this time, the trend was moving away from colo-
i
nialism and progressed through the breakdown of empire to the 
emergence of numerous free but underdeveloped countries. These
lipresident John F. Kennedy, quoted in Harris, The Dollar 
in Crisis, p. 13.
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new countries, as well as many old ones, have become of much 
strategic importance in the post-World War II era. Their im­
portance has primarily been as pawns in the Cold War efforts of 
both East and West and as a. means of carrying out the American 
foreign policy of the time, to contain Communism. The United 
States, then, has been faced with the difficulty and expense of 
waging the Cold War in all its aspects, political, economic, 
diplomatic, and military, and, at the same time, the individual 
and increasingly persistent aspirations of the newly independent 
nations for rapid economic development.
In accepting these responsibilities, whether they be in­
terpreted as challenges or as burdens, the United States became 
an international power with national pride and prestige tied to 
its policies. Western Europe, in contrast, declined in inter­
national influence both economically and militarily. Perhaps 
much more significantly, however, is Western Europe’s achieve­
ment of a remarkable economic recovery and the continuation of 
sustained growth without the heavy burden of defense. Western 
Europe, therefore, relinquished international economic involve­
ment for the sake of domestic economic progress; in other words, 
Western Europe has unprotest.ingly allowed the United States to 
assume its former international military role and., thereby, has 
concentrated its total effort in one area. The result lias been 
the ,Tmost remarkable economic progress within Europe since 
before 1913. Consequently, Western Europe has prospered
•| OTobin, National Economic Policy, p. 77.
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financially tit the national level at the expense of international 
prestige and leadership.
Not only has the progress been remarkable within Western 
Europe, but also in relation to that of the United States. Since 
1950, certain Western European economies have grown proportion­
ately faster than that of the United States in both productivity
"I Oand gross national product. While this growth itself offers 
no direct threat to the United States’ economy, its effect has 
been to strengthen the Western European competitive position in 
world markets. At the same time, Western European economies 
have been attempting to move toward continental unity. Combina­
tion of these two developments could lead to a further reduction 
in the competitive position of the United States in foreign and 
domestic markets.
While Europe has been concentrating on internal growth, 
unhampered by large external security expenses, the United States 
has been spending large sums of money for overseas commitments. 
This situation, from an American point of view, might be inter­
preted as the ’’economic consequence of the passing of an age of 
free security, /for the defenses now available are, at best, 
uncertain, and/ unlike the natural barriers that once protected
— — ] i|/the United States/ very, very expensive." Not only has the
United States lost the possibility of choosing between interna­
lsTobin, National Economic Pol icy, p . 77.
p.  7 2 .
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tional involvement and isolation, but also the security of geo­
graphic isolation or inaccessibility. Material vulnerability 
therefore, has become a very real concern in both a physical and 
financial sense.
Initially, however, this vulnerability was obscure and 
seemingly remote. In the period following World War II, however, 
these expensive security appropriations made under the Marshall 
Plan, as well as those made in the early 1950Ts were spent by the 
recipients in the world market. The United States at that time 
was the primary and, in many cases, the only source for needed 
products. It was not until the 1950Ts that the situation changed 
as Western Europe became more competitive. As more aid dollars 
were consequently spent outside the United States, these even­
tually came into the possession of Western European central 
bankers who could and sometimes did exchange them for gold 
through the United States Treasury. At the same time, the trade 
lost by the United States further weakened its overall compet­
itiveness .
In short, new defense responsibilities and their con­
current expenses created a military situation which undermined 
the strength of the United States financially. Furthermore, 
this weakened condition occurred concomitant to Europe’s vigor­
ous recovery and increasing strength. What this meant on the 
national level was the the United States could no longer bo 
considered the world banker and, in effect, the country had conic 
of age in the sense that it was now experiencing problems,
frustrations, and burdens similar to those other nations had long 
endured. These two reversals, then, the flow of capital in favor 
of Western Europe and the assumed role of defender, have ulti­
mately resulted in Western Europe’s refusal to continue ac­
cepting without question and without participation in the inter­
national leadership adopted by the United States in the post- 
World War II era. Essentially, therefore, a process of equaliza­
tion has taken place.
With the development of these two trends in the 1950’s 
and their continuation throughout the 1960’s, economic policy 
determination has presented an intricate, complex, and perplexing 
problem for national policy-makers. While the economic recovery 
of Western Europe and Japan after World War II was considered 
highly desirable and in the national interest of the United 
States, correction to some extent of the United States’ economic 
position today has been favored by a. majority of American econo­
mists. This contemporary concern over the national debt, how­
ever, contrasts sharply with earlier attitudes. Previously, 
throughout most of the postwar years, and even through the 1950’s, 
a deficit account was not disparaged. On the contrary, the "de­
ficit balance in the United States international accounts was 
regarded as a. desirable condition and U.S. economic foreign
I ̂policy was framed with the intent to continue the deficit.”
John 0. Hogan, The U.S. balance of Payments and Capital 
flows (New York: frcdcr.ick A. Prauger, Publishers, 1967), p. 90.
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In the decade of the 1960's, however, the current of thinking has
ebbed in relation to continuing the deficit.
Several factors helped to bring about a change of opinion.
Among these were the emergence of the European Common Market, the
restraint on fiscal and monetary policy and, significantly,
"pride, the symbolism of gold, and confusion about the basic
16causes of the deficit." Just as surprise was registered at 
Western Europe’s remarkable recovery, so too was the alteration 
in the international economic position of the United States un­
expected. This shift was comprehended in 1960 when a run on 
gold occurred. Coinciding with this incident was a period of 
domestic regression and bothersome unemployment. In 1958, the 
rate of unemployment was 6.8 percent and until 1963, hovered 
around 5.5 percent. Consequently, the balance-of-payments 
deficit as well as unemployment became political issues in the 
1960 campaign.
At the beginning of the decade of the 1960’s, when the 
Kennedy Administration took office, the enunciated economic ob­
jective was growth with the least possible amount of inflation. 
This objective was threatened by the balance of payments which
the President believed to be responsible for restrained expan-
18sionist policies. To release restraint on the domestic economy
^ ’iJohn D. Hogan, The U.S. Balance of Payments and Capital 
Plows, j). 90.
17 Ibid. , p. 91.
.18' Seymour E. Harris, Economics of P]if Kennedy Years (New 
York: Harper and Row, ]*ub I. ishers, 1964), p. 148.
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would result in growth, but it would also fan inflation with fur­
ther deterioration of the balance of payments. The question, 
therefore, remains how to reconcile domestic and foreign economic 
policy in order that the goals of both might be met. As a re­
sult, arguments have emerged which support an expansionist do­
mestic policy as the best answer for dollar protection. Such a 
policy would not only insure American growth but, incidentally, 
would solve the deficit problem. This policy, "with large 
creations of money and federal deficits, /promises to/ bring 
prosperity and inflows of capital, a reduction of outflows of
capital, and even lower costs and, hence, induce an improved
19competitive position." The balance-of-payments problem, 
handled as an adjunct to domestic policy, would become synonymous 
with expansion rather than restriction and, therefore, not in 
conflict with domestic policy.
This economic policy objective of growth with minimum 
inflation has been continued throughout the 1960Ts, and, at the 
same time, attempts have been made to achieve a favorable bal­
ance of payments by increasing exports, decreasing imports, and 
keeping costs low. Such an effort, however, is contradictory in 
that a relative rise in incomes resulting from internal growth 
corresponds to an increase in imports and a decrease in exports. 
To export more within this framework implies a domestic policy 
which controls inflation and, thereby, involves the whole 
political/economic spectrum.
19Harris, Economics of the Kennedy Years, p. 197.
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Diametrically opposed to this conclusion is the Western
European experience "where growth twice as large as /in the
United States/ seemed compatible with a. large favorable balance
of payments. Although a number of factors were working
against this improved position in Western Europe, (e.g., less
21discrimination against American goods and Public Law 480), ‘ it
has persisted and the balance-of-payments position of the United
p pStates has deteriorated. c-
Under these conditions, strong advocates of wage and 
price policy have emerged. To make the United States 
more competitive and restore equilibrium, anti-inflationary 
domestic policies become fundamental to this view. One repre­
sentative of such a viewpoint suggests disinflation which, in 
contrast to deflation, would prevent or avoid inflation without 
augmenting the ranks of the unemployed.Dismissing exchange- 
rate alterations, exchange control and deflation as undesirable 
methods, money wages in deficit countri.es would rise somewhat 
slower than productivity in order that prices might decline, 
while in surplus countries, the rise in wages should at least
^Harris, Economics of the Kennedy Years, p. 149.
^Public Law '180 is the more common designation for 
Title I of the Agricultural Trade, Development and Assistance 
Act of 1984 and allows for surplus agricultural commodities to 
be exported under subsidy conditions.
H ar r i s , T1 io 1 )o 11 a r i n C r 1 s i s , p . 7 .
2-̂ Cottfr.ied llnberlor, "Domestic Economic Policies and 
the United States Balance of Payments," in Harris, The Dollar in 
Cr t sis, p . 67.
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be comparable to that of productivity. This proposal would not, 
therefore, require a reduction of wages but an acceptance of
O Ndiscipline. The alternative, barring intentional inflation in 
surplus countries or a significant, unforeseen growth in demand 
internationally, would be exchange rate modification.
In conflict with this new point are the economic condi­
tions in West Germany. Indeed, those conditions seem to refute 
this argument, for wages there have risen more than in the 
United States during the period from 1955 to I960; yet, this 
rise did not appear in West Germany's relative inflation. The 
explanation offered is that significant increases in output af­
fecting productivity offset the wage rise.^
Another approach toward improving the trade position of 
the United States vis-'h-vis other countries is devaluation of 
the dollar. This recommendation rests on the assumption that the 
dollar is indisputably overvalued and has been for quite some 
time in relation to Western Exiropean currencies. Furthermore, 
this overvaluation is
implicit almost tautologically, in the fact that the country 
has been unable to achieve a satisfactory balance of pay­
ments, in spite of maintaining a higher level of unemployment 
than generally considered desirable and in spite of the
^'Gottfried Uaberler, "Domestic Economic Policies and 
the United States Balance of Payments,” in Harris, The Dollar 
in Crisis, p. 72.
^\Sir Roy Harrod, "The Dollar Problem and the Gold 
Question," in The Dollar in Crisis, eel. by Seymour E. Harris 
(New York: Hareourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1901), p. 5*1.
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buttressing of the balance of payments by a variety of spe­
cial measures designed to increase foreign-exchange receipts 
on both current and capital account beyond, what would have 
resulted from normal commercial transactions.^
For these reasons as well as by statistical analyses involving 
relative purchasing power, relative unit costs of production, 
and econometric analysis of the exchange rate, the conclusion 
reached is that current dollar overvaluation is between 15 and 
25 percent.^ Following this argument to its conclusion, over­
valuation has caused an unnecessarily high unemployment rate 
coupled with an unsolvable balance-of-payments problem, thereby 
posing the ’’classic policy conflict between the requirements of 
external and internal stability." This conflict would be 
further aggravated by contiguous circumstances, e.g., business 
investments abroad and, consequently, export of technological 
innovation, thereby further supplementing the competitive 
strength of Western Europe.
Devaluation of the dollar, however, would be a radical 
departure from the past economic policies of the United States, 
and appears to have no general and strong support at this time. 
Therefore, an alternative solution has been sought, which has 
attempted to originate and combine policies working toward both
2(,Harry G. Johnson, "An Overview of Price Levels, Employ­
ment, and the Balance of Payments,” in The Dollar Deficit:
Causes and Cures, ed. by H. Peter Cray (Boston: D. C. Death and 




internal and external stability, permitting expansionary domestic 
policies, while not adversely affecting the balance of payments.
One such related policy would involve reducing the out­
flow of United States capital, thereby reducing payments. While 
this would appear to be somewhat of a shift in emphasis from re­
ceipts to payments, it would indirectly affect exports.
Although the goal of increased exports has been consis­
tent and explicit, one of the chronic difficulties in dealing 
with the balance-of-payments problem has been the virtual im­
possibility of isolating a. specific cause or causes. To illus­
trate the magnitude of this difficulty, in I960, the United 
States recorded $33 billion in payments and transfers and $29 
billion in receipts.^ While the balance-of-payments deficit 
lias stubbornly persisted, totaling $20 billion for the period 
19S0 to 1960, it is equally remarkable that West Germany, Italy, 
and Japan, "three countries with an aggregate GNP less than one-
fourth of that of the United States, could absorb a balance-of-
o npayments surplus nearly equal to the U.S. deficit." To pin­
point certain factors in this web of international transactions 
offers little hope for fully untangling it. Such a description 
suggests the complexity of the problem and denies a single 
solution.
^Edward M. Bernstein, "The New Administration and the 
Dollar-Payments Problem," in '1'bc Dollar in Crisis, ed. by Seymour 
E. Harris (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961),
p. 81.
30 Ibid. p. 75.
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Given this complexity of international transactions and 
their effect upon the balance of payments, it would not seem, 
therefore, that isolation or concentration upon only a certain 
few factors would achieve the desired solution. Rather, con­
centrating upon the interaction of several factors has been ex­
perimented with recently. One attempt has involved adopting and 
implementing domestic policy which reduces the outflow of gold. 
This outflow has been especially noticeable in foreign invest­
ments, and appears to be in response to some financial incentive. 
The result of foreign investment and the establishment of sub­
sidies and licensees has been to diminish United States techno­
logical superiority. Accompanying the investment of funds was 
the export of technique, and thus the most modern machines, 
skills, and production methods were transferred to plants of 
foreign countries which frequently were constructed by United
*3 IStates dollars.
In addition to a loss in technological superiority, the 
United States also lost markets due to the policies of foreign 
governments. Since American companies which sold to European 
markets were paid in national inconvertible currencies, these 
companies began buying products in the European market which 
were previously purchased in the United States. Consequently, 
American buyers, because they demanded more quality and effi­
ciency, trained Europeans to meet their requirements. *S.
31 Irving li. Kravis, "The U.H. Trade Position and the 
Common Market," in Problems ol' the Modern Economy, ed. by Edmund
S. Phelps (New York: W. W„ Norton and Co., Inc., 3000), p. 336.
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Furthermore, economic reasons, e.g., higher profit mar­
gins, tax advantages, low labor costs, closer proximity to the 
market, as well as a means of overcoming tariff barriers, ex­
change controls, and Government purchasing policies, have moti­
vated the establishment and expansion of brandies, subsidiaries,
o nand licensees in Western Europe and e l s e w h e r e T h e  overall 
effect of these foreign affiliates on the domestic economy has 
not been clearly established. In fact, the question as to 
whether incentives for foreign investment actually exist has not 
yet been resolved.
Despite the questions surrounding the actual existence of 
tax incentives, however, the advantages afforded to the coun­
tries which import United States technology is readily apparent. 
Indeed, the advanced stage of American Research and Development 
activities has been said to
"explain” competitive trade success in manufacturing in­
dustries considerably better than any other variable tested. 
This finding is consistent with a view that the world eco­
nomic role of the United States involves the systematic 
export of new products.^
In this study, the conclusion is drawn that a definite and strong 
relationship does exist between the concentration upon Research 
and Development by American industries and the export value of
■^Irving B. Kravis, "The U.S. Trade Position and the 
Common Market,” in Phelps, Problems of the Modern Economy, 
p. 358.
^Donald U. Koesing, "Impact of RED on U.S. Trade," The 
Journal of Political Economy, LXXV (February, 19G7) , '15.
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their products. Moreover, those industries actively engaged in 
Research and Development display economies of scale and high- 
level skill requirements in their production, and, significantly, 
"capital requirements are inversely associated with R&D.  ̂
Western European countries, therefore, benefit doubly by the im­
port of American technology. Not only do they improve their own 
competitive trade position, but they also manage to avoid the 
expense of technological innovation.
From the evidence available, it seems more probable that 
the broad effect of overseas affiliates is adverse. As a result, 
the argument has been put forth that tax policy should afford no 
special privileges to foreign investment.Following this 
argument, the United States should not encourage further aggra­
vation to the national deficit by providing an incentive in the 
form of tax policy. This would appear to be a matter of self- 
interest.
An extension of this argument would require a revision of 
laws to place American corporations which operate through sub­
sidiaries on the same level as those which operate through 
branches, or in the some category with domestic corporations.
'^Keesing, "Impact of R&D on U.S. Trade," p. *15.
J) ̂ ] b id . p. MS.
^Irving B . Kravis, "The U.S. Trade Position and the 
Common Market,” in Phelps, Problems of the Modern Economy, 
p. 358.
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In other words, tax revision would require payment of full taxes 
on corporation income whether distributed or not. The rationale 
behind such a proposal is that the time of international dollar 
shortage is past. No longer does the United States need to be 
concerned with stimulating the economies of Western Europe. In­
stead of allowing and, indeed, encouraging the flow of capital 
from this country by means of subsidiaries, which both strengthen 
the competitive trade position of Western Europe and cause do­
mestic problems to become more frustrating, the United States 
should instead contemporize its policies to synchronize with the 
dollar glut situation.^
The question arises, next, of the extent to which these 
capital exports contribute to the United States balance-of- 
payments deficit. The contribution appears to be sizable. Of 
annual deficits amounting to between $3 and $*+ billion, United 
States capital exports accounted for $2,884 million in 1958;
O O
$2,301 million in 1959, and $3,,ll40 million in 1960. Further­
more, additional exports of capital to underdeveloped countries 
are keenly sought, and one means of providing this increase is 
by deflecting capital exports away from countries already highly 
developed.
In addition to large capital exports made possible by 
such seemingly antiquated tax laws, sizable outflows of capital
•’̂ Harris, The Dollar in Crisis, p. 23.
~^lb id, p. 21.
have occurred under monetary policy which established low interest 
rates on short-term loans. For the period from 1958 through 1960, 
"the United States lost $11 billion in gold and accumulation of
■3 qshort-term dollar debt to foreign countries.” 3 In attempting to 
control these short-term outflows, national and international 
goals again overlap and conflict. A further complication is that 
the method of reconciliation depends upon the political party in 
office at the time.
In general, the two parties are distinguishable by their 
traditional monetary policies. The Democrats are said to be the 
party of easy money and the Republicans the opposite. Essen­
tially, this means that the Democrats generally favor monetary 
expansion or reduced interest rates to ease the burden of debt 
and expand credit and output, whereas the Republican ideology 
has been influenced by the
Puritans with their emphasis on saving and the classical 
economists with their insistence either that money makes 
no difference to the level of output and employment or 
that an expansion of money merely brings a corresponding 
rise of prices.^
The effects of these political attitudes influence both domestic 
and foreign policy.
In the concern over a balanced international budget, and 
with political attention focused on domestic inflation, full 
employment has been affected, and the reverse is also true.
34
Seymour E. Harris, The Economics of the Political Parties 
(Now York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), p. 330.
l|0Ibid. , p. 100.
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The intricacies of this problem are seen by an economic overview
of the 1950Ts. In summary of this period,
The tightening of credit, which in early .1953 was undertaken 
as an anti-inflationary measure, had something to do with the 
business downturn in the summer of that year. The easing of 
credit in 1954, which helped to promote recovery, was a 
factor bringing about the resumption of inflation early in 
1956. Delay in relaxing credit curbs in 1957, which was 
widely criticized, was attributable largely to a determina­
tion on the part of the System to avoid the excessive ease 
of 1954. Tightening of credit in the third quarter of 1958 
may have slowed down the pace of the recovery at that time 
getting under way. It is apparent that the path between the 
objectives of full employment and price stability is narrow 
and difficult.^
Circumscribing the whole issue has been the strong political in­
fluence of labor. The conflict which exists over interest rates 
and inflation, therefore, involves not only full employment and 
price stability, but more broadly, fiscal in opposition to mone­
tary policy, and domestic challenging international economic 
policy.
Since this interlocking economic relationship between 
domestic and international policy exists, it has prompted policy 
recommendations on the international level as well as the do­
mestic to improve the United States trade position. One signifi­
cant proposal has reference to United States trade relations 
with Communist countries, especially the Union of Soviet Social­
ist Republics (USSR). The predominant attitude toward such 
trade has, in the past, been extremely negative. A number of 





cd., Postwar Foonom I e Trends in the 
arper and brothers, I960), p. 87.
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Politically, United States goals have sought to restrict and iso­
late Communism, or contain it. To accomplish this goal, con­
sidered essential to national security, the United States at­
tempted to create solidarity among the Western bloc of nations.
Unfortunately, such solidarity was much more in evidence 
in the immediate postwar period than it is currently. Since the 
early 1950Ts, a crumbling process has broken up the political, 
military, and economic ties, both in the areas of cooperation and 
coordination. Evidence of this is seen in the wane of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the impotence of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and, finally, the 
gradual termination of informal political relationships allowing 
for informal coordination. In reality, therefore, the concept of 
solidarity has not been conspicuously demonstrable or defendable.
In addition, the assistance furnished by the United States 
in establishing the European Economic Community has perhaps fur­
ther segmented Western Europe. In any case, the coagulation of 
the six nations involved, coupled with considerable gains in 
Western European productivity have served to segment and regroup 
the Western countries. With this economic regrouping, the other­
wise separate and relatively powerless countries have secured a 
more favorable trade position, especially in confronting the 
United States.
Based upon these circumstances, it would seem that im­
provement of the United States balancc-of-payments problem by 
substantially increasing exports over imports would have serious
37
complications. These complications rest on the assumption that 
it would be unlikely that either the European Economic Community 
or the other trade bloc, the European Free Trade Association, 
would agree to lower tariffs without a similar commitment by the 
United States. Under the GATT agreement, these organizations 
are required only to "fix their outside tariffs at a level which 
maintains the same general incidence of protection as prevailed 
before the common market was developed." Under these circum­
stances, the Western European trade blocs are in a position to 
expect and perhaps command reciprocity. Unfortunately, such 
reciprocity would be no simple matter for the United States be­
cause of legal entanglements and restrictions on presidential 
power.
While the Trade Agreements Act of 1939 empowered the 
President to reduce tariffs up to 50 percent in the conclusion 
of trade agreements, subsequent stipulations have reduced the
h Qoriginal authorization to the point of all but superseding it.
In essence, these qualifications which have evolved have been 
intended to protect American industry from serious injury from 
imports. Definition of serious injury has become so expanded 
and'all-inclusive, however, that the intention of the Act, i.e., 
to encourage innovation and adjustment, has not materialized.
H2Raymond Vernon, "Solutions: Trade Policy," in The 
Dollar in Crisis, ed. by Seymour E. Harris (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and World, Inc., 1961), p. 210.
113Ibid, p. 210.
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Instead, the opposite effect has been produced and the need for 
adjustment by labor and industry has been minimized.1'1*
Short of a fundamental change to this domestic concept of 
injury, as well as a revamping of legislation, the President can 
hardly undertake meaningful negotiations to reduce tariff bar­
riers with any of the European trade blocs. At the same time, 
the possibility of implementing protectionist policies with the 
intention of shifting the national deficit to other countries 
seems unrealistic. Such attempts would be strongly discouraged 
by the contemporary fact that retaliatory action could realisti­
cally be expected.
Between the polarity of reciprocity demanded for tariff 
reduction and retaliation, which would most likely be imposed 
for the adoption of protectionist measures, is seen the tension 
between domestic and international politics. Not only do do­
mestic interests have the benefits of lobbyists, the backing of 
Congressmen, and the appeal of nationalism, but they have a long 
line of historical and legal precedents. Assuming that these 
barriers to liberalized trade practices will not be eliminated 
in the immediate future, the possibility of establishing new 
trade relations has appeared tantalizing.
Although it has been only recently that such a proposal 
would be seriously heard in the United States, nevertheless, an 
opportunity for trade with the Soviet bloc gradually held some
''''Raymond Vernon, "Solut ions: Trade Policy," in Harris, 
The Dollar in Crisis, p. 211.
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interest. It has been only in the postwar era, however, that the 
Soviet bloc has been recognized as a full-fledged member of the 
world trade circle. One of the hindrances to full trade partici­
pation in world markets up to that time had been the Soviet 
blocTs "almost pathological . . . insistence on balancing income 
with outgo in such t r a d e . T h i s  has been carried to the point 
of even disregarding convertible currencies and insisting on 
bilateral balancing. Such a policy has been attributed primarily 
to a cultural lag which may possibly be overcome.
Indeed, it has been proposed that a parallel exists be­
tween the Soviet blocTs attitude toward comparative advantage 
and multilateralism, and
just as the Soviet bloc discovered the concept of comparative 
advantage in 1953 or 1959, so we may anticipate that it will 
shortly discover the mechanism of multilateral clearing and 
will invent its own version of currency convertibility. b
Furthermore, indications are that the Soviet bloc desires more
trade with outside countries, although it is hard to conceive
that the Soviet bloc would allow itself to become dependent on
foreign trade any more than the United States has. The remaining
essential ingredient is a mutual desire on the part of external
countries to establish trade relations with the Soviets. There
does, therefore, exist, even though remotely, the possibility of
a new economic relationship between the Soviet bloc countries
and the rest of the world.
11'’Raymond Vernon, "Solutions: Trade Policy," in Harris, 
The Dollar in Crisis, p. 219„
l|6Ibid, p. 219.
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On the other hand, the possibility of increased trade 
relations with the Soviet bloc would also entail the risk of ad­
versely affecting the balance of payments. The thesis and 
antithesis of the problem posed are as follows:
1. the specter of a heavy trader in the free world’s 
markets, armed with the control devices necessary for 
earning foreign exchange, and capable of arbitrarily 
manipulating these foreign exchange earnings, and
2. the alternative, equally unappealing, to continue the 
practice of bilateral balancing and through a web
of bilateral controls to inhibit the specter.
There is a third choice of a more moderate nature and more 
tolerable to United States desires than either of the two pre­
ceding. Such a choice might involve collaboration among the 
free world nations aimed toward reaching an agreement which 
would combine freedom of trade with control over the balance or 
imbalance. It would seem that the advantages of additional 
markets and transactions might be secured without compromising 
the position of control over reserves and the balance of payments.
Such methods would tend to counteract the Soviet advantage of
48centralized control by the State.
Should such a proposal be adopted and a trade agreement 
be reached, a reversal of national policy would have occurred.
This national policy toward the Soviet bloc has been one of 
economic discrimination, but one which has become increasingly
^Raymond Vernon, "Solutions: 
The Dollar in Crisis, pp. 219-220.
98 lbj d.,
Trade Policy," in Harris,
p. 220.
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ineffectual in persuading other countries to follow suit. Such a, 
policy change would involve, among oilier things, a. revision of 
certain legislation, notably the Export Control Act and the 
Battle Act.1'*"® Non-compliance with this legislation carries the 
danger of the abolition of aid. Despite the problems in making 
these moderately revolutionary changes, the necessity for trade 
advantages might overshadow the obstacles.
Finally, should it be the case that none of these avenues 
were to lead to equilibrium through political channels, or were 
found to be objectionable, and yet the need was of such urgency, 
one other solution seems possible. Since the United States al­
ready has a surplus of exports over imports and needs only to 
equalize or exceed payments, the possibility, although not prob­
ability, of reducing or eliminating foreign aid and defense ex­
penditures exists. Such action could, of course, spawn unpre­
dictable political ramifications which, in the extreme, might 
lead to an international devaluation of the United States among 
the underdeveloped countries.
In summary, movements in wages, productivity, and export 
prices considered together do tend to support the thesis of a 
deterioration of the American position. As a result, Western 
Europe and Japan gain to a great extent because they attract 
American capital in large amounts. This in itself is a measure 
of Western European and Japanese advancement because they export
'^The Export Control Act covers export-licensing stan­
dards and the Battle Act proscribes what products may be shipped 
to the Soviet bloc by foreign-aid recipients.
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more as their capacity increases. The question developing, then, 
is, if domestic and foreign policy changes or modifications con­
tinue to fail to deal effectively with the balance-of-payments 
deficit, should the United States consider a. reduction or 
elimination of foreign defense and aid expenditures?
CHAPTER III
CURRENT ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
In the preceding chapter, one of the possibilities which 
has been suggested for reducing the United States balance-of- 
payments deficit and, thereby, achieving an equilibrium or a 
favorable balance was to cut foreign defense and economic assis­
tance expenditures. Such a recommendation might eliminate the 
deficit since the trade surplus has been insufficient to meet 
foreign commitments. Consideration of remedial action in this 
area, however, entails not only the question of whether foreign 
aid expenditures should be reduced, but also would a profit be 
gained significant enough to compensate for the tremendous in­
tangible loss which would occur?
It has been previously stated that the United States ac­
cepted the responsibilities for defense and economic assistance 
of foreign underdeveloped countries through the default of 
Western Europe after World War II. Assumption of this responsi­
bility on a unilateral basis following the war, however, was pre­
figured by other steps begun on an international and multilateral 
basis as early as 19MM. At that time, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were created with the intention of
MB
avoiding a chaotic economic situation such as that which followed 
World War I.1
For national security reasons, emphasis was placed upon 
world economic stability to be achieved through reconstruction 
and development. These plans, therefore, were to include both 
industrialized countries recovering from the effects of war and 
those nations not yet modernized or industrialized.
Subsequently, a number of agencies in addition to the 
World Bank have functioned through the United Nations and con­
centrated solely upon economic development. Since they consist 
of multi-nation membership and are not political in nature, i.e., 
they neither vote within the United Nations General Assembly nor 
become involved, in military matters with other nations, these 
agencies have been relatively free from criticism and unhampered 
in their operations. These operations, however, are quite
limited in scope since only 10 percent of the total world eco-
2nomic assistance funds are channeled through them.
Rather than administer its assistance programs throug+i 
international agencies or through multilateral agreements of 
another sort, the United States chose to oversee and control its *2
1+1+
^The International Monetary Fund was established by the 
Bretton Woods Agreement of 19lM+. Its purpose has been to pro­
vide external reserves and impose rules of behavior on national 
authorities to coordinate their action. For a discussion of its 
operations, see Tibor Scitovsky, Money and the Balance of 
Payments (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 19G9) , pp. 159- 
178.
2Wolfgang G. Friedmann, George Kalmanoff, and Robert F. 
Meagher, International F inancial Aid (New York: Columbia Uni­
versity Press, 19GG) , p. 383.
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comprehensive programs on a unilateral basis. With the vacuum 
left by the decline of Western Europe and the apprehension 
regarding Russian intentions in the postwar period augmented by 
the specter of numerous repetitions throughout the world of com­
munist usurpations, acceptance of a foreign assistance program 
was not strongly contested. Indeed, it may very well have had 
its roots as early as the 1920Ts, as a response to the second 
World Congress of the Communist International. It was there that 
a challenge was issued to the colonial and dependent countries 
to revolt against their oppressors, or Western overlords. Since 
the end of World War II, it has been the United States which has 
sought to meet this challenge and deny both influence and control 
within the underdeveloped world to Russian or other forms of 
Communism. It is for this reason that foreign assistance is as 
much political in nature as it is economic.
Indicative of this political aspect is the very origin of 
the foreign aid program, which was begun under President Harry 
Truman. In January of 1999, after the President’s Inaugural 
Address, the United States aid program was begun under the Mutual 
Security Administration. This is significant in that a key prem­
ise was maintaining internal and external security. Foreign 
aid, then, was justified through linkage to the communist threat 
and, ultimately, to national survival. The importance attached 
to the program is seen in the fact that the nation diverted 
$'l billion in one year for foreign aid, a sum which matched the
L|6
total outlay for the development of the atomic bomb only a few 
, • 3years earlier.
What began with a sense of urgency and immediacy and 
with cohesiveness of supporters, however, has experienced a loss 
in momentum as it became increasingly clear that foreign aid 
assistance was a very prolonged and long-term proposition. Lon­
gevity was not accented in the initial stage. Subsequently, it 
has gained attention as a subject of political debate. Ques­
tions not only of duration have been raised, however. In 
addition, motives, objectives, and measurable or demonstrable 
results have been subjects of contention. This is particularly 
true since recent and frequent attempts have been made to attach 
the issue of foreign aid to the balance-of-payments problem.
For national security reasons, therefore, foreign aid 
has been continued up to and throughout the 1960’s, and no termin 
ation date has been projected for the immediate future. This 
endurance, however, has not been unchallenged, with the result 
that both the appropriations requested by the Administration and 
the outlays passed by Congress have been reduced in recent years.
What, then, has vindicated the continuation of a seem­
ingly unpopular program? This is partially explained by the 
background of the foreign aid program. The precedent for foreign 
aid was set during the Truman administration. It was followed in 3
3John I). Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 11.
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the Eisenhower years, but not with the same clear consensus of 
purpose either by the public or within the Congress. As Presi­
dent Eisenhower noted,
foreign aid doesn’t have any pressure groups in any Con­
gressman’s district. It is something that has to depend 
on the intelligence of the American people and not on 
selfish interest.
Depending upon that intelligence, however, has resulted in fluc­
tuations and an unstable history for foreign aid. Appealing to 
something of a more basic interest, President Kennedy resurrected 
the earlier and easily comprehended threat to national security, 
but softened his plea with an element of conscience. In a policy 
statement issued in 1961, President Kennedy said that
The economic collapse of those free but less-developed na­
tions which now stand poised between sustained growth and 
economic chaos would be disastrous to our national security, 
harmful to our comparative prosperity, and offensive to our 
conscience.̂
These reasons, then, protection, prosperity, material well-being 
and moral reparation have formed the basis of the rationale for 
engaging in a continuing foreign aid assistance program.
With this rationale as a basis for action, what objec­
tives have been established? Very broadly, the policy objectives 
have been as follows:
>1U.S., President, Department of State Bulletin, May 27, 
1957, p. 8>l8.
'’President John F. Kennedy, ’’Foreign Aid, 1961,” in Why 
Foreign Aid?, cd. by Robert A. Goldwin (Chicago: Rand McNally 
and Co., 1962), p. 1.
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1. similar to all foreign policy, produce a political and 
economic environment in which the United States can best 
pursue its own social goals;
2. promote internal security through financial assistance, 
which will short-circuit internal disorders and stabilize 
existing governments; (The conflict here, of course, is 
that existing governments may resist needed changes, and 
internal disorders which are aimed at change may be sup­
pressed, thereby thwarting United States long-range 
goals.)
3. and, insure the security of the United States and its 
allies from external aggression by providing military 
installations and armaments.
These objectives of production, promotion, and provision were to 
be achieved through implementation of five categories of aid. 
These are:
1. Development Grants, with provision for personnel, capital 
goods, and commodities, and with emphasis on education.
2. Development loans, aimed at long-range development and 
repeiyable in dollars.
3. Supporting assistance, including both grants and loans 
intended to promote internal security, while balancing 
military expenditures.
i+. Military assistance, including grants, loans, and the
provision for military equipment, supplies, and training 
assistance, initially aimed at external security but with 
an additional thrust toward internal stability as well.
5. Food for Peace, offering grants, loans, or sales for 
local currency of surplus agricultural commodities.7
While the objectives and means of implementation are easily
enough delineated, the overriding problem has been evaluating the
Ulollis T5. Chencry, "Objectives and Criteria for Foreign 
Assistance," in Why Foreign Aid?, ed. by Robert A. Goldwin 
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1902), p. 33.
^Ibid., p. 3M .
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effect of this assistance. The difficulty and, frequently, the 
impossibility of ascertaining the effect or of pinpointing tan­
gible and defensible results, short of becoming deeply involved 
in the internal affairs of recipient nations, has been a per­
plexing one.
The ambivalence surrounding the documentation of foreign 
aid assistance has, therefore, created an air of both uncertainty 
and skepticism. One exception to this, however, has been the 
area of military assistance which seems to have generated little 
dissension over amount or motive. Its long-range effect, how­
ever, has been questioned. Since military assistance frequently 
has the effect of stifling the influence of more progressive 
orientation by strengthening existing political conditions, its 
long-range value might be questionable. On the other hand, by 
maintaining stability, military assistance insures the opportunity 
for advancement. Such assistance, in any case, does involve the 
United States in the internal affail’s of another country, how­
ever tacitly.
With the tension between the balance-of-payments problem 
and its connections to both trade and aid, it would seem that 
attention would have to be devoted to dollar deployment on an 
individual country basis. Since the aspects and aspirations of 
each country differ, the United States has been constantly faced 
with choosing among them. As a matter of practicality, it ap­
pears tliat the choice has been made on the basis of which coun­
tries could be expected to profit most from international fi­
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nancial assistance. While this viewpoint does remove the justi­
fication of foreign aid from a moral plane, it also seems to 
assume that economic assistance programs are not temporary, but 
rather are representative of an historical trend.
At the same time, the hostility confronting the United 
States in some of the underdeveloped countries is the product of 
decades of resentment, seemingly not entirely without justifica­
tion, particularly in the area of military intervention. This 
fear and resentment has been carried over to the negotiations 
concerning assistance, for these countries seem to fear that a 
different kind of intervention in their internal affairs will 
take place, i.e., economic interference. Such occurrence would 
not be without historical precedent, e.g., the Dominican Republic, 
1905.
Added to the tendency for political instability and 
chronic poverty, the underlying uncertainties regarding the 
motivation and intentions of the United States have caused some 
uncertainty among the developing nations regarding their own 
adoption of capitalism. Therefore, broad foreign aid objectives, 
especially in the pursuit of national social goals, are under­
mined. That which is being exported is not only financial aid 
but also ideology, for in the current war of ideas to enhance in­
fluence over underdeveloped countries is a strategic objective.
To export capitalism, however, is no simple matter, for 
that which is being passed on appears not to be truly repre­
sentative of the American system. Those elements which seem to
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be missing in exported capitalism are pragmatism, compromise, 
individualism, pluralism, and democracy, each of which has been
Oan integral part in the development of the American system.
What has been missing in exported capitalism, then, seems to be 
some reconciliation between democratic freedom for the individual 
and a steadily increasing economic growth rate.
Furthermore, it seems that under these circumstances, 
military assistance has been an influence upon the effectiveness 
of the foreign aid program since its beginning. The assertion 
has been made that ’’nothing could so damage /the United States/ 
the world around as a policy that sought to sustain its own 
military power at the expense of efforts to aid the poor people 
and the poor lands.”9 If this assertion is correct, then the 
military assistance program assumes increasing significance. Not 
only is it of political significance, however, for its economic 
impact is also of consequence.
Since this expenditure in the past has been separate from 
economic development assistance, its contribution to the balance- 
of-payments deficit has been obscured. Therefore, in light of 
the political and economic significance, the argument has been 
made that closer attention should be paid to the security which
g
R. Joseph Monsen, Jr., Modern American Capitalism. 
Ideologies and Issues (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), 
p. 121.
and the
9John Kenneth Galbraith, "Some? Thoughts on Public 




is bought and to its effects. Considering the difficulties en­
countered in modifying the balance-of-payments deficit, economic 
as well as political scrutiny would seem well-advised.
This is not to say, however, that foreign aid military 
expenditures should be eliminated. Rather, such a viewpoint 
attempts to realistically take into account that a direct rela­
tionship between assistance given to foreign countries and their 
favorable economic development does not necessarily follow if 
contradictory programs exist. Moreover, even generous and con­
tinuous aid cannot insure peaceful as well as progressive eco­
nomic development.
If, in fact, there is no guaranteed link between foreign
assistance and economic progress, nor any assurance that United
States objectives will be met, why then continue? Questions
regarding the advisability of foreign economic assistance from a
self-interest standpoint have been raised since the beginning of
the program. Even Western Europeans registered surprise at
American willingness to export capital to areas which undoubtedly
would be competitors in only a few years. In commenting on
the large-scale assistance made available to Western Europe and
Japan after World War II, the Economic Commission for Europe,
staffed primarily by Europeans, noted that
The United States is thus in the strange position of fi­
nancing a programme which is directed largely towards the 
reduction of its own exports. It faces the anomalous 
prospect that, by the end of the programme, it will have
^John Kenneth Galbraith, "Some Thoughts on Public Policy 
and the Dollar Problem," in Harris, The Dollar in Crisis, p. 95.
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surpluses and excess production capacity in commodities 
for which it has helped (directly or indirectly) to de­
velop substitute sources of supply elsewhere; its own ex­
ports to Europe will be reduced below the depression-shrunk 
volume of 1938 and Europe nevertheless will still be short 
of dollars to cover its imports from the United States.
Despite these dire observations, the assistance was provided, and
Western Europe did recover and become highly competitive once
again, but the volume of United States exports did not diminish
to a crisis level, nor has Europe lacked dollars for payments.
Perhaps the best explanation for America’s continued industrial
leadership is that it has maintained its economic growth and
concentrated upon technological innovation, and has demonstrated
12that these areas are essential to such leadership.
In the early post-World War II period, therefore, the 
prevailing American attitude was characterized by the belief that 
the foreign aid program was to the benefit of the United States 
as well as to the recipient country. This viewpoint, however, 
was not universally shared. More recently, the foreign aid pro­
gram has been continued in spite of persistent internal criti­
cism. The rationale has been that the risks involved are too 
great to abandon this policy.
■^Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of 
Europe in 19M8 (Geneva: Economic Commission, 19M9), p. 222.
12Albert 0. Hirschman, ’’Effects of Industrialization on 
the Makers of Industrial Countries,” in The Progress of Under­
developed Areas, ed. by Berthold. F. Iloselitz (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 283.
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Despite the lack of immediate and obviously favorable 
results, the argument is often given that foreign aid has been 
the means through which communist expansion in the so-called 
"decisive third of humanity" has been curbed or at least tempo­
rarily deterred. Granted the potential negative aspects, (e.g., 
military assistance may threaten regional stability or failure 
of deterrents may result in communism taking over what has been
provided) nevertheless an overall net value has been calculated
13to such an extent that assistance has continued.
Perhaps the most serious problem has been in setting the 
goals too high, which has resulted in widespread public disen­
chantment. This disenchantment has been very difficult to 
counter. Efforts to present foreign aid assistance in a positive 
framework have concentrated upon the practical and the possible, 
rather than humanitarianism or the crusading spirit. The 
creation of new markets for future trade has presented foreign 
aid as a positive, sound investment. In the meantime, however, 
a national deficit has been plaguing the country, and the direct 
connection between the two has been made far too often.
One method directed toward both tasks (i.e., supple­
menting trade and improving the deficit) has been the use of 
tied aid requirements. These requirements have met with much 
resistance in aid-receiving countries. The opposition to this 
method has claimed that the expenditures for economic aid appear 
minute in the United States budget. The basis for this conclu-
■*'^Montgomery, The Politics of foreign Aid, p. 19.
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sion is a comparison between the United States national income or 
Gross National Product (GNP) and the percent of this amount allo­
cated for foreign aid. For instance, in requesting Congress to 
allocate $3.58 billion for military and economic assistance for 
fiscal year 1966, the Administration stressed that such allocation 
would represent
the smallest burden_on the American taxpayer: one-half of 
one percent of /the/ GNP (compared with 2% at the height of 
the Marshall Plan), and 3.5% of the federal budget (compared 
with nearly 12% seventeen years ago.
Therefore, foreign aid assistance, both military and economic 
development, would appear to he a small percentage of the present 
national income as well as considerably less than previous allo­
cations. For this reason, so the opposition concludes, tying 
aid, or requiring that funds provided by assistance programs be 
used for purchases in the donor country, would accomplish little 
in solving the economic problems of the United States.
On the other hand, questions have been raised as to the 
validity of this view. Since Congress has appropriated funds for 
military assistance separately from economic development assis­
tance in the past, the possibility has been suggested that classi­
fication under direct and indirect military aid could be expanded. 
This possibility relates to the general Congressional acceptance 
of military assistance requests as contrasted to its increasing 
resistance to economic development funding. Consequently, the
1,,U.S. , AID and II.S. Department of Defense, Proposed 
Mutual Defense and Development Programs for FY 1966 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 5.
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allegation has arisen that "what in form is straight military aid
may in effect be equivalent to economic aid, and it is often
difficult to distinguish.”"*""’ If economic aid should be more
significant than government statistics indicate, tied aid might
prove to be of some benefit to the United States, although not
necessarily to the aid recipient.
The claim that tied aid is not necessarily beneficial to
the recipient country is substantiated by strong resistance to
this practice. The degree of resistance to the tied-aid concept
is seen in a 196b United Nations Conference resolution, which was
X6supported by virtually all recipient countries. The resolution
claimed that the practice of tying aid to purchases in the donor
country inhibits international competition and limits the freedom
of choice on the part of the recipient country. However, the
resolution also recognized the validity of some of the reasons
17why this practice is followed.
In spite of criticism, however, this practice of tying 
aid has been continued. It has been suggested that "probably the
■'--’Milton Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid: Means and 
Objectives," in Problems of the Modern Economy, ed. by Edmund S. 
Phelps (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1966), p. 958.
-*-̂ This resolution was adopted by a vote of 81 to 9, with 
25 abstentions. The negative votes and abstentions were pri­
marily those of the developed countries, including the Soviet 
bloc.
Trade
^United Nations, Conference, Rcv.iow 
and Development (UNCTAD, Inf. 1), 1966
of I international
, P .  Tl-5.
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most compelling circumstances in the increasing trend toward
country tying of aid is the balance-of-payments problem of the 
1 8United States.11 Since the United States is the largest single 
donor in providing funds for underdeveloped countries, as demon­
strated in the following chart, and since the United States has 
followed the practice of tied aid since 1959, other countries 
engaging in foreign aid have not been inclined to modify or 
abandon this practice either.
TABLE II
LONG-TERM OFFICIAL CAPITAL TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1956-6b 
(Values in Millions of Dollars)
TOTAL DAC COUNTRIES UNITED STATES
Year Value % Value %
1956 3,206 100.0 1,996 62.3
1957 3,753 100.0 2,083 55.5
1958 b. 285 100.0 2,388 55.7
1959 b, 23 2 100.0 2,310 5b.6
1960 b,898 100.0 2,850 58.2
1961 6,07b 100.0 3,535 58.2
1962 6,0b3 100.0 3,713 61. b
1963 6,060 100.0 3,8b2 63. b
196b 5,908 100.0 3,53b 59.8
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
1965 Review (New York: OECD , 1965), p. 127.
Whether or not other countries would be so disposed should
the United States release its bilateral , tied funds is a matter
of conjecture. Surely they would realize tangible gains, while
the United States could achieve only intangible ones and risk
1H1'r iedmann, Internationn! Financial Aid, p . '121.
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political support for the continuation of foreign aid appropria­
tions as well. Certainly one of the arguments favoring the pro­
gram has been the feedback to American industry, funds made 
available to underdeveloped countries would be returned in the 
purchase of equipment and goods, thereby meeting economic as 
well as political concerns. Therefore, while balance-of-payments 
problems may be the immediate cause of tied aid, economic and 
political reasons may offer an enduring explanation.
Such a practice, however, is neither unique nor limited 
to the United States. This practice has been followed by the 
Soviet bloc as a political link with the recipient country.
In the United States, tied aid has been the policy of the Export- 
Import Bank since its inception. Furthermore, the aid program 
administered by the Agency for International Development (AID) 
is tied primarily for balance-of-payments reasons, but is in­
fluenced by commercial reasons as well.
In presenting the AID program for fiscal year 1966, the 
Administration emphasized that "the U.S. procurement policies 
followed over the past four years have minimized the drain of 
our assistance programs on our balance of payments . . . /and
asserted that/ another result of AID’S procurement policy is a
19substantial export business for American private enterprise.”
19U.S., AID and U.S. Department of Defense, Proposed 
Mutual Defense and Development Programs for FY 1966, p. 17.
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Consequently, it would seem that, lacking the influence and 
pressure of foreign aid recipients, members of Congress would be 
more sensitive to commercially-concerned constituents. Further­
more, they might continue to support foreign aid appropriations 
despite balance-of-payments problems as long as the aid was tied, 
thus profiting the industrial sector of the United States.
While tied aid may claim to have some advantages, dis­
advantages also exist. Not only is tied aid opposed by most 
recipient countries, but it may also conflict with the primary 
purpose of the overall foreign aid program, which is economic 
development. Since the basis of economic development is thought 
to be the availability of capital, and aid-recipient countries 
have been unable to provide capital for themselves, the United 
States has done so. The result has been a virtual obsession 
with centralized planning and control by the government. Under 
these circumstances, pressure for demonstrable progress to the 
natives of a country, the donor, and the world has given rise to 
"monument building.” Just as man desires and demands symbols in 
religion and politics, so he does in economics. Conceivably, 
much money can be and is wasted on symbolic though economically 
meaningless and undesirable projects.
Not only may the government construct unfruitful, waste­
ful projects, but its very decision-making process may strangle 
flexibility. Consequently, it would seem that the very prin­
ciples of the communist system, from which the United States has 
been seeking to protect these underdeveloped countries, is
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promoted by its own economic aid dollars.^ The ultimate effect 
then might be to hasten the spread of Communism in the under­
developed world. 2-*-
The question posed is why the underdeveloped countries 
would be so strongly in favor of centralized government and 
central planning. This inclination appears to stem from disen­
chantment with the free market mechanism. Too often the under­
developed countries have been in the position of having no market 
for their products due to high tariffs and trade barriers. This 
situation has further tended to inhibit foreign investment in 
comparison to that in developed countries.
This situation is somewhat more understandable, however, 
when the fact is considered that underdeveloped countries as a 
whole "contribute less than half of the worldTs primary ex­
ports. in addition, these countries are highly dependent upon
some few major exports and are quite vulnerable to world market 
fluctuations. For these reasons, strong emphasis has been placed 
on central planning and control.
To avoid the restrictions of central planning, an alter­
native has been sought. One proposal has been that the United 
States openly announce that by a specified date, it will have
? nMilton Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid: Means and 
Objectives," in Phelps, Problems of the Modern Economy, p. 441.
"̂*"Ibid., p. 44 6.
P Pc Ilia Myint, The Economics of the Developing Countries 
(New York; Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964), p. 25.
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abolished all tariffs, quotas, and restrictions in favor of free
trade in the most literal sense. Its proponent asks:
Can there be any doubt that the effects on our international 
position--both immediate through the announcement effects 
and ultimately through the long-run economic effects--would 
be vastly more favorable than those achievable by any con­
ceivable program of foreign economic aid even if one assigns 
to that aid all the virtues claimed by its proponents?^
Temporarily ignoring the related difficulties, it has been argued 
that such action would benefit the United States multilaterally 
and would have more influence psychologically than the foreign 
aid which has already been provided. Furthermore, the "transi­
tion to free trade would have far less of an impact than techno­
logical changes that occur decade after decade and that /the 
United States/ take/s/ in . . . stride." In such a viewpoint,
termination of foreign aid would offer no insurmountable problem. 
The solution would be to make one large and final payment which 
would have been announced well in advance.
Such an approach would offer one decisive and final 
resolution to the dilemma of long-range commitment to foreign 
aid and its deteriorating effect on the balance of payments.
Short of taking such radically liberal action, however, other 
means have been utilized, notably the tied aid requirement. This 
approach has been expedient because it can be invoked unilater­
ally and brings quick results. Conversely, tied aid appears 
to be essentially protectionist in nature and may hinder
23 . _ . Milton
Objectives," in
Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid: Means 
Phelps, Problems of the Modern Economy, P
and 
. h51.
2Mlb id.5 p. H52.
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developing countries by requiring them to make purchases in the 
United States which could possibly he bought on the competitive 
market for less. Nevertheless, the alternative of reducing for­
eign aid would seem to be more detrimental to their overall econ­
omic development than continuation of tied aid requirements.
The gain from tied aid, however, may he less than ex­
pected because of the reduction of American exports to other 
countries and the possibility of aid countries "leaking” or di­
verting purchases to other countries. Still, it is claimed
that "tied aid makes a significant contribution to easing /the 
- 25United States/ dollar problem." Despite this easing of the
problem, the foreign aid program as a whole has undergone much
criticism in the 1960’s. This widespread criticism, notably
26that of the Clay Committee, has been reflected in Congressional 
scrutiny of foreign economic aid proposals and their justifica­
tion.
While the findings of the Clay Committee were supported 
in some areas, these findings served primarily to substantiate 
criticisms circulating at the time, (e.g., inadequate contribu­
tions from abroad, failure of self-help by the recipients,
25Harris, Economics of the Kennedy Years, p. 157.
n r
^uThe Clay Committee chaired by General Lucius Clay pre­
sented its Report on Foreign Aid in 1963. The Committee’s find­
ings emphasized the adverse effect of foreign aid on the balance 
of payments. The result of these findings will be discussed 
further in Chapter IV.
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excessive aid for unjustified political reasons, overextension
geographically), and also contributed to the program cuts of 
271963. Indeed, the program appears to have reached its summit 
in the immediate postwar period from 1946 to 19M9. Thereafter, 
it has experienced a slow proportionate decline in relation to 
the rise in GNP and export activity.
In addition to tied aid, other methods of foreign assis­
tance which are profitable to both donor and recipient have been 
sought. For instance, surplus goods have been given away, sold 
below market prices, or for foreign currencies. The essential 
effect of these practices, however, has been to increase both 
exports and foreign aid. Consequently, no net improvement has 
been realized in the balance-of-payments deficit. Therefore, 
with the exhaustion or failure of numerous experiments, separate 
and interrelated, attention has turned to increasing the parti­
cipation of other developed nations.
If the United States is unable to achieve either larger 
exports or smaller imports without damaging its trade relations 
with Western European countries and Japan, then perhaps these 
other developed countries should participate more fully in for­
eign economic and defense outlays. This argument recognizes 
that a balance-of-payments deficit in the United States cor­
responds to a surplus in other countries, and those which have 
a surplus could assist in reestablishing equilibrium. This
27Harris, Economics of the Kennedy Years, p. 173.
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would be one means of offsetting the pressure of American de­
fense and aid expenditures, if the decision is reached that re­
duction "is not the solution called for by economic conditions
28in this country or by political conditions abroad." Rather, 
this argument might suggest that expenditures should be in­
creased and, in order to do so, contributions from the surplus 
countries are needed. While this action alone would not totally 
eliminate the balance-of-payments problem, with the help of 
other measures adopted by the surplus countries, it might con­
siderably improve it.
It has been pointed out frequently that continued ac­
cumulation of reserves is not in the interest of the surplus 
countries. Such a practice "deprives the people of the oppor­
tunity to use more of their own output for consumption and
home investment and for the acquisition of income-earning assets
29in private investment abroad." Besides sharing responsibility 
for foreign defense and aid, surplus countries could also in­
crease their imports and foreign investment as additional 
measures aimed at international equilibrium.
The real question, then, is not whether the United States 
can afford its foreign aid program, but rather should it continue 
to relieve other high-income countries of a share in international
TOEdward M. Bernstein, "The New Administration and the 
Dollar Payments ProbJ_em," in Harris, The Dollar in Crisis, p. 84.
^ Ib id., p. 8M .
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defense outlays. Although it should be recognized that the GNP 
of surplus nations does not compare with the United States GNP, 
soon to be exceeding $1,000 billion, nevertheless their recent 
growth partially has been made possible by the release from high 
defense costs, both internally and externally. However, it does 
seem almost unjustifiable that the United States should virtually 
beg these countries to share the burden of foreign aid, consid­
ering that the United States has a per capita income of two to
30three times that of most of the Western European countries.
While it might be argued on the basis of per capita in­
come that allocations could be increased, this is not feasible 
from a balance-of-payments standpoint. Again, the options seem 
to be reduced to a rise in exports, a decline in imports, or a 
reduction in foreign aid expenditures. With these alternatives, 
sometimes it is argued that the United States cannot afford to 
relieve other high-income countries of sharing the burden of 
defense and aid. The question is how to accomplish this burden- 
sharing.
Accompli slime nt presupposes that surplus countries would 
acquiesce to and accept these expenditures. Yet, it appears 
that some countries have been unwilling to continue accepting 
United States world leadership without challenge. Why, then, 
should deference be given in the economic realm? The answer to 
this question seems to relate to the post-World War II change in 
the concept of power’.
Harris, The Dollar in Crisis, p. 9.30
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One very influential reason for any involvement in for­
eign aid programs, which undoubtedly has some bearing on the 
attitude of Western European countries and Japan, is this changed 
concept of power. Both economically and politically, such new 
national power alignments as the Afro-Asian Group, the Fourth 
Force and the Neutralists have created an enlarged concept of 
power. This concept is demonstrated in the changing role of the 
military.
Until recently, power, in the twentieth century as well 
as a good part of history, has been equated with military might. 
The change which has occurred recently is that influence can be 
as effectively exerted through economic means as well as through 
military means. This change has been made possible by the ex­
treme poverty and lack of fully developed social order in the 
developing nations and, hence, the need for economic assistance.
Given the need for economic assistance and the deploy­
ment of dollars which has already taken place, the question be­
comes one of individual evaluation. How successful have the 
methods of the United States been in achieving the stated goal,
i.e., establishing a stable, free, democratic/capitalistic so­
ciety within a particular country? While precise gauging of 
this success is nebulous, the fact that capitalism faces a 
serious challenge is easily enough recognized. Essentially, 
economists have failed to convince aid-recipient countries that 
American and British-stylc economic development systems can 
produce growth either as rapidly as other systems, or rapidly
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enough to prevent social disorder and revolution, while coping 
with the underlying complication of the population explosion.
In short, the question has not been satisfactorily settled as to 
how economic development can best be achieved, as well as maxi­
mum personal choice attained, insofar as the developing countries 
are concerned.
With the power base broadened to include economic, politi 
cal and military strength, the struggle for economic superiority 
has shifted from physical to ideological conflict. This ideolog­
ical conflict has exposed itself in economic warfare, which is a 
new dimension of hostilities. This new dimension of hostilities 
has been defined as follows:
Economic warfare is an integrated program taking in more 
than just the question of international trade relations 
in troubled times . . . rather, it encompass/es7 all 
those actions in either Cold or Hot War on the domestic 
and foreign front that are designed to enhance our own 
or our allies economic strength for national security, or 
to detract from the adversary’s economic potential.'’1
Not only has the primary weapon shifted from military to economic 
strength, but the time span also differs. In the twentieth cen­
tury, wars have generally been considered temporary. By con­
trast, economic warfare as well as economic mobilization is not 
temporary and should be recognized as an historical trend. This 
is demonstrated by the Soviet Union’s avowed and frequently ar­
ticulated commitment to economic warfare. Therefore, as long as 
this is the case, trade as well as aid will have political 
connotations.
John J. Clark, The Now Economics of National Defense (New 
York: Random House, Inc., I'JOGJ , p. ISM.
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Economic warfare is in one sense a repetition of the 
past, but in another, parallels the development of human con­
flict. The evolution of economic warfare has paralleled that of
human conflict in that it has progressed from limited to total
32to unified warfare. The level on which warfare is conducted 
today, the unified level, allows for peace to exist only inter­
mittently. The manner in which this warfare is conducted in­
cludes:
1. denial of resources to the enemy which, of course, may 
result in reciprocal measures, thereby accomplishing 
only minimal benefits;
2. utilization of foreign aid programs aiming at long-range 
results, which are formulated on the basis of strategic 
considerations; and
3. emphasis on continued economic 
than a mobilization of forces.* 3
Economic considerations, then, may exert a tremendous 
and possibly a deciding influence on strategy. Moreover, the 
significance of economic policy and performance in the Cold War 
has been that it has become the criteria for positioning the 
nation in the world power alignment. In effect, economic sup­
port has bolstered political and military influence. For these 
reasons, economic policy is directly tied to foreign policy 
objectives.




Although a direct relationship does exist in this area, 
as well as in the others already mentioned, economic warfare in 
its utilization of foreign aid contains a contradiction. An area 
of conflict has developed between the two components of foreign 
aid, military and economic assistance. Essentially, military 
assistance is designed to preserve and protect existing institu­
tions, policies, and governments, while economic assistance is 
designed to induce changes in the status quo, encourage initiative 
and innovation, and result in progress.
Furthermore, this conflict is reflected within the under­
developed nations receiving aid. The "war of ideas" being waged 
between the West and the East has resulted in the "export of 
ideology" and the great difficulty of importation by developing 
countries. The conflict arises from the inability of developing 
nations to adhere to either Western or Eastern ideology, pri­
marily because of the economic split that divides the developed, 
wealthy North from the underdeveloped, impoverished South.
Since the problem has an economic basis, the thrust of 
United States policy has been toward alleviating economic lag, 
while assuming that the political situation would thereby also 
be resolved. This approach has lacked effectiveness in large 
part because "export capitalism" has not included all the com­
ponents of American capitalism. Furthermore, economic warfare 
seems contradictory. On the one hand, it sanctions liberalized 
trade even with a known ideological opponent. On the other hand,
7G
it extends aid to uncommitted nations. In the final analysis,
"economic warfare employs economic power to shape world affairs
31+in a fashion compatible with national interest." Of over­
riding and unresolved importance is determination of what the 
national interest really is, or of what takes precedence at the 
particular time.
In short, the dilemma of ideological conflict is re­
flected in the interrelation of international trade practices, 
domestic policy, and foreign aid programs. In the conduct of 
economic warfare, it may appear to be in the nation’s best 
interest to trade with an admitted enemy, to mobilize forces 
for expansionary domestic policies to facilitate growth, and to 
use foreign aid programs to buy friends. Justification and 
approval of these policies prefigure sanctioning a deficit in 
the balance of payments.
3MClark, The New Economics of National Defense, p. 176.
CHAPTER IV
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRENDS OF TIE POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD
Certain significant trends which have affected the 
American balance-of-payments situation in the post-World War II 
era are quite readily recognizable. Moreover, they have been 
thoroughly documented. These include the relative decline of 
the United States trade position internationally and the con­
tinuation of a bilateral aid program despite persistent deficits 
Others, while less readily apparent, are rather commonly ac­
cepted. These include the evolution of economic warfare and its 
relevance to trade and aid considerations, and the decline of 
American leadership among Western nations in political and eco­
nomic affairs. Additionally, there are still others that have 
been advanced by some authorities but probably should be quali­
fied. Qualification is necessary because of the wide divergency 
of opinion among those considered to be authorities. Included 
among these possibilities is the culmination of prolonged 
balance-of-payments deficits in international economic chaos. 
Such chaos would be the combined product of the failure of inter 
national negotiations and of ineffective domestic economic 
policies to control inflation.
These authorities or influentials include economists, 
members of the academic community, government officials, bankers
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and businessmen. Such categorization, however, is not static. 
Rather a very fluid situation seems to exist among these group­
ings. Furthermore, many of these authorities hold contradic­
tory opinions, and present impressive documentation to support 
their particular conclusions. Consequently, the executive and 
legislative branches have been presented many alternatives for 
coping with both domestic and international economic problems.
Choosing among the alternatives available has resulted 
in careful and lengthy deliberation followed by experimental 
methods of coping with fiscal problems. These experimental 
methods have been offensive to some, unsatisfactory to many, and 
inconclusive to most. Disagreement has been evident not only 
among authorities, however, but also among policy-makers, par­
ticularly between the Administration and the Congress in the 
area of foreign aid. These problems, then, of maintaining and 
hopefully improving export competitiveness, supporting an exten­
sive foreign aid program, and reaching an agreeable reform for 
the present international monetary system, illustrate the per­
plexing economic concerns which have emerged in the post-World 
War II era, all of which directly relate to the American balance 
of-payments problem.
Efforts toward improvement of the American balance-of- 
payments problem, moreover, have met with and been affected by 
external developments over which the United States has been 
unable to exercise full control. Among these developments has 
been the growth of the European Economic Community, commonly
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referred to as the European Common Market. This organization is 
reputed to be the largest trading unit in the world economy and 
has diverted some trade from United States exports.^ Likewise, 
foreign aid expenditures originated in response to an external 
situation, i.e., the threat of the spread of Communism through­
out the underdeveloped world. In the past decade, foreign aid 
expenditures appear to have become self-perpetuating. Further­
more, the need or demand for this assistance has been exceeding 
the supply approved, yet no termination date has been projected 
at the present time.
Finally, the problem of international liquidity has re­
appeared in the postwar period. A major topic of discussion 
during the economic crisis period of the 1930's, the subject of 
international liquidity was thereafter diminished by World 
War II, postwar recovery, and international security considera­
tions. Only recently, with the persistence of balance-of- 
payments deficits, has the subject been revived in the United 
States. Agreement on proposed reforms and continuing interna­
tional cooperation, however, has not been attained. Neverthe­
less, the need for reform has generally been recognized through­
out the world.
Long-range objectives, therefore, have not been success­
fully established in regard to these problems. Rather, fiscal 
policy often appears to have been the product of seemingly
Delbert A. Snider, Intornationnl Monetary Relations 
(New York: Random House, I960), p. 110-111.
disconnected problems resolved on an individual basis as the need 
arose, with only temporary solutions applied. Monetary policy, 
on the other hand, may be moving toward a more comprehensive 
solution. This situation, however, is perhaps more reflective 
of the political decision-making process than of the economic 
considerations involved.
While it has been claimed that the relative trade posi­
tion has declined, it should also be pointed out that the United 
States claims the distinction of being the largest producing 
nation in the world, ranking fourth among the nations of the 
world in population, and possessing an unequalled level of per
capita income; also, the United States is the world’s largest2domestic market as well as the largest source of savings. Stated 
another way, the United States is often described as having about 
one-sixth of the world’s population and possessing between one- 
third and one-half of the world’s wealth. With such a distinc­
tive economic situation, an explanation for the decline rests in 
part on what facilitated this preeminence.
Economic superiority, until recently, has been promoted 
by certain unique features of geography and economic structure. 
With the disappearance of some of these advantages, relative 
decline in international competitiveness has occurred. Among 
these vanishing advantages, some of which have already been 2
2Council of Economic Advisers, "The United States as 
World Trader, Investor, and Banker,’’ in Problems of the Modern 
Economy, ed. by Edmund S. Phelps (Now York: W. W. Norton and 
Co., Inc., 19GG) , p. 337.
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mentioned or alluded to, are
1. the possession of large supplies of cheap natural 
materials, the reduction of which has forced the United 
States to compete in world markets for scarce supplies;
2. the benefit of high agricultural productivity, which 
has been encumbered by government supports and controls 
brought about by a market not truly free;
3. the stability of relatively static concentrations of 
capital, the end of which has been brought about by 
improved communications;
M-. the profits of entrepreneurship, which have been dimin­
ished by capital outflows for private investment, ac­
companied by American entrepreneurship, production 
techniques, and product design;
5. the opportunities of being one of very few nations en­
gaging in mass production based upon available capital, 
technological innovation, and market size; and,
6. the maximation of American technological superiority 
to insure competitiveness in world markets.
With the loss or reduction of four of these advantages which
directly relate to the balance-of-payments problem and to
American competitiveness, remedies have been avidly sought.
Since the outflow of private capital appears basic to
these same four points, efforts to isolate and control this
factor have been made. While there has been quite a diversity
of opinion over the effects of private foreign investment and
the establishment of subsidiaries, branches, and licensees
abroad in other industrialized countries, arguments stressing
the adverse effect on the balance of payments have prevailed
momentarily. In February of 1965, voluntary restraints were
Irving B. Kravis, "The U.S. Trade Position and the 
Common Market,” in Phelps, Problems of the Modern economy, 
pp. 350-365.
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initiated as part of a broad presidential program to countermand
4further deterioration of the American balance of payments.
This program remained voluntary from 1965 through 1967, but on
January 1, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson announced a series of
new measures which included mandatory controls over foreign 
5investments.
Since their implementation, these controls have received 
repeated criticism by those affected. The regulations issued by 
the Commerce Department which limit direct investment abroad and 
require repatriation of foreign earnings have been opposed for the 
same reasons that they were applied. The opposition claims com­
petitive disadvantages which ultimately will be injurious to the 
balance of payments and will adversely affect American exports. 
Retaliation also becomes a very real concern to this viewpoint.
In addition, the legal authority under which these controls were 
issued has been questioned, allegations made that the balance- 
of-payments problem stems from fiscal disorder which is ob­
scured by such regulations, and also state that such require-
0
ments place an intolerable administrative burden on industry. 
Rather than these controls, industry’s spokesmen have favored
^Machinery and Allied Products Institute, Overseas 
Manufacturing Investment and the Balance of Payments (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 142.
"’u.S., President, New Year’s Day Message (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968, p. 13.
0
u.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxa­
tion, Digest of Oral Testimony Presented to the Committee on Ways 
and Means with Respect to the Administration’s Hal a nee-of-Payments 
Proposals (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), 
pp. 'I-7.
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a return to voluntary restrictions and. incentives. Beyond this, 
they have proposed the removal of the 30 percent withholding tax 
exacted from dividends and interest paid on both corporate and 
governmental securities, in order to increase foreign investment 
in United States securities.'7
Offsetting the restrictions of mandatory controls was 
the proposal of an expanded governmental program aimed at long­
term export increase. This five-year program was intended to 
concentrate exclusively upon export expansion and promotion.
The President’s proposal resulted from a study completed and 
issued in 1967 by one of the action committees of the National 
Export Expansion Council.^ Under this program, business in­
terest and cooperation was to be enhanced through a long-term 
commitment by Government to export expansion. Consequently, 
business and industry, with this assurance, could better plan 
and program their international affairs. Specifically, the 
President proposed an intensified five-year, $200 million Com­
merce Department program to promote the sale of American goods 
overseas and a joint export association program through which
^U.S., Congress, The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue 
Taxation, Digest of Oral Testimony Presented to the Committee on 
Ways and Means with Respect to the Administration’s Balance-of- 
Payments Proposals, p. 8.
^The National Export Expansion Council was formed in 
1960. It comprises 72 business and professional leaders who 
serve in an advisory capacity to the Secretary of Commerce and 
other Government Agencies concerned with United States foreign 
trade.
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the Government would provide direct financial support to Ameri­
can corporations which joined together to sell abroad.^*
Such a proposal represented a significant increase in 
funding for such purposes. In fiscal year 1960, the first 
appropriations for the Commerce Department’s export expansion 
activities were made. An initial appropriation of $9.6 million 
in 1960 grew to $12.2 million in 1968, showed little increase 
until 1967 when it reached $18.7 million, and, finally, $19 
million for fiscal year 1968.10 The objective of these activi­
ties, as defined by the Assistant Secretary for Domestic and 
International Business under the Johnson Administration,
Mr. Lawrence McQuade, has been to increase the United States 
trade surplus by approximately $5 billion per year. Such
growth would result in a total export goal for 1973 of $50 bil-
12lion, or 8.3 percent of the projected gross national product.
To reach the desired level of $50 billion, exports would have to 
maintain their rate of growth achieved annually since 1962, or 
8.3 percent."^
®U.S., President, New Year’s Day Message, p. 11.
^nU.S„, Congress, Joint Economic Committee, A Review of 
the Balance-of-Payments Policies (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1969), p. 11.
-^Ibld., p. 3.
-^According to Bureau of the Budget figures, the GNP has 
been steadily rising from $95.0 billion in 1980 to $263.3 billion 
in 1950, to $895.2 billion in 1960, and $817.0 billion in 1968. 
The projected GNP for 1973 will be over $1,162 billion.
 ̂~’U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, A Review oT 
the Balance of Payments Policies, p. 6.
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To assist business in reaching this goal, the National 
Export Expansion Council began identifying specific products as 
well as strategic areas which might offer the most potential for 
United States exports over a five-year period.However, 
achievement of this projected goal presupposes certain domestic 
as well as foreign conditions. Since the United States is the 
world's largest domestic market, comparable attractions would 
have to exist overseas to encourage American business to shift 
its emphasis abroad.
The difficulty of such an accomplishment is seen in the 
extent of the current domestic orientation. For instance, in 
1967 exports represented only M- percent of the American gross 
national product. In comparison, Japan's exports represented
9 percent of its gross national product; French exports claimed
10 percent; Italy and the United Kingdom, 13 percent; West 
Germany, 18 percent; Netherlands, 32 percent; and Belgium- 
Luxembourg, 35 percent.15 Therefore, such a change of priority 
would seem to necessitate strong incentives for American busi­
ness .
Even incentives and refocused emphasis alone, however, 
would not suffice. Other factors such as the purchasing power *
National Export Expansion Council, 1968 Reports on 
Policies and Actions to Improve the U.S. Balance of Trade and 
Balance of Payments (Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, 
1968), p. 3.
* 5Council of Economic Advisers, "The United States as 
World Trader, Investor, and Banker," in Phelps, Problems of the 
Modern Economy, p. 337.
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and relative economic strength of AmericaTs major trading part­
ners would also have influence. Dynamic and expansive economies 
abroad would encourage increased exports, and, likewise, eco­
nomic slowdowns abroad would cause American exports to suffer. 
More significant, however, is the American domestic economy.
Despite other disagreements, virtually every recommen­
dation for improving the American balance-of-payments situation 
includes the necessity of controlling domestic inflation. The 
continued rise in labor costs since 1964 contrasts unfavorably 
with the trend in Western Europe and Japan. Under these cir­
cumstances, a permanent increase in exports from b percent to 
b.3 percent of the gross national product could prove difficult.
While exports, labor, and prices have grown, imports 
have also increased. Although imports ordinarily tend to check 
inflationary forces, a significant increase such as that in 1968 
has the effect of virtually obliterating the otherwise impres­
sive surplus without curbing domestic inflation.^ The un­
answered question in this situation is how much of the import 
increase was due to full employment and higher incomes. In such 
a context, the result might not be interpreted dismally. In 
relation to the balance of payments, however, the result was 
detrimental, for it was added to other domestic problems such
’Through November of 1968, exports had reached $33.7 
billion which was 9 percent above 1967Ts total. However, imports 
totaled $32.7 billion, which was 22 percent above the 1967 total. 
For complete statistical discussion, see U.S., Congress, The 
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, The Balance of 
Payments (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969).
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as threatened and actual strikes and other work stoppages. The 
concurrent rise in imports, therefore, was a setback to the 
broad, experimental policies applied by the Johnson Administra­
tion to curtail the deficit.
While the measures applied were innovative and the re­
sult of much deliberation, they were extremely unpopular with 
certain groups. Opposition to certain measures has arisen from 
either academics, economists, bankers, or businessmen, and, 
occasionally, from all four. Despite this unpopularity, however, 
credit for success must be given. As the Chairman of the Joint 
Economic Committee, the Honorable Henry S. Reuss, stated at the 
time, it must be "concede/d/ that at least a portion of the re­
duction in 1968 in /the/ payments deficit has to be attributed 
to these governmental efforts."^ To determine acceptability 
as well as effectiveness, these measures should also be con­
trasted to the alternatives which might have been applied.
Other measures which might have been applied include 
transportation and expenditure taxes for overseas travel and 
a revision to the national tax structure. An Administration 
proposal for such a tax on travel outside the Western Hemisphere 
was made in 1968, but found little support in Congress. The 
proposal was aimed to offset the travel deficit in the balance 
of payments. This deficit in 1967 was $2.1 billion, with no 17
17U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Balance-of- 
Payments Policies, Hearings, before a subcommittee on Interna­
tional Exchange and Payments, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, p. 1.
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improvement expected. By 1975, a travel deficit in excess of
$R billion has been projected.18 Consequently, President
Johnson recommended a remedy in the form of reduced American
travel abroad either by voluntary restraint or by legislation.
This action was to be coupled with adequate appropriations for
attracting foreign travel to the United States. Although the
proposal had as its goal a $500 million reduction rather than
elimination of the total travel deficit, adoption was not
favored in Congress. In December of 1968, the need for adequate
budgetary funds to stimulate foreign travel in the United States
19was again stressed by the Administration. Funding for such 
purposes, however, has not received the necessary priority 
status.
Another possibility for improving the balance of payments 
is through revision of the country’s tax structure. Certain 
European countries recently have made changes in their tax struc­
ture which have been of benefit to them in this same endeavor, 
but the main emphasis of the United States has been upon in­
creasing exports. The advantage of a tax revision is that im­
mediate results may be elicited, and timeliness has been a major 
concern of those attempting to correct the American deficit.
18U.S., Department of Commerce, Reports (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. U8.
1^U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Letter from 
Secretary Fowler, Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Balance 
of Payments, December .17, 1968, A Review of Balance ol Payments 
Polj cles, p. (I9.
83
Although the effect of the "Kennedy Round" agreements 
should increase both exports and imports, the major thrust is 
not expected to occur until 1972. Beyond that, an additional 
five years may be necessary to achieve the full effect. In the 
meantime, exporters still face, in addition to regular tariff 
duties, a variety of measures which inhibit full access to 
foreign markets. Therefore, some measures have been sought to 
reduce the barriers thus erected. Consideration will therefore 
be given to these proposals.
Simple changes duplicating those made in Western Euro­
pean countries, however, are not considered possible. Tradi­
tionally, the United States has favored a system which relies 
heavily upon direct taxation. Consequently, American indirect 
taxes are considerably lower than those imposed by the Western 
European countries. Furthermore, according to former Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury Stanley S. Surrey, the United States 
ranks near the bottom of the industrialized countries of the 
world as far as the amount of taxes collected relates to gross 
national product.^
Modification of the present American tax structure 
could, however, raise the amount of taxes collected and possibly 
reorient business toward foreign markets to some degree. This 
could be done by instituting a national excise tax with rebates 20
20 ,U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue 
Tax a tion, Digest of Oral Testimony Presented to the Committee 
on Ways and Means with Respect to the Administr;rtionTs Balnncc- 
of-Payments Proposals, p. 38.
and border taxes such as West Germany and France use. Through 
general theory and international practice, such a levy shifts 
the tax forward in the price of the item or commodity. There­
fore, an indirect or hidden income tax is levied which is not 
reflected as such.
While the use of the excise tax is an acceptable uni­
lateral action which many nations use, it seems to have little 
support in the United States. Those opposed to the application 
of a national excise tax view it as administratively cumbersome 
and less equitable than present practice. Therefore, the con­
sequences of molding domestic tax structure to accommodate 
international trade considerations have appeared unrealistic 
as long as other means are available to achieve the same or 
s imil ar obj e ctive s.
Rather, suggestions have been made for revision of the 
present General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules.
Under these rules, countries afflicted by balance-of-payments 
difficulties may achieve temporary relief through quota 
restrictions. Such restrictions may be applied on a multilateral 
basis. However, the use of such quota restrictions carries the 
implicit threat of retaliation which may set off a spiral of 
restrictions resulting in a trade war. This threat appeared to 
be imminent in the 1970 drive in Congress to pass protectionist 
trade legislation against Japanese textile imports. Such ac­
tion was averted by a conditional, three-year agreement by the 
Japanese industry to impose voluntary quotas.
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Theoretically, therefore, a number of possibilities exist 
for improving the balance-of-payments problem through export ex­
pansion. Choosing the best alternative involves a delicate bal­
ancing of interests, domestically and internationally, and even 
the best alternative may result in unforeseen repercussions.
To complicate the situation further, accurate analysis of re­
sults is hampered by a variety of statistical methods which may 
be used to compute the balance. Each of these several methods
emphasizes one particular aspect of the balance-of-payments posi-
21tion and, therefore, yields different results.
Not only do methods of statistical analysis differ within
the country, but also among countries. A lack of international
uniformity in accounting plus a substantial difference in the
quality of statistics among different countries and among the
types of transactions which affect them individually, lead to
the conclusion that "no simple number can adequately describe
the international payments position of /the United States/ at 22any time." The balance-of-payments position of the United 
States, therefore, is, among other things, relative to the 
selected statistics. This relativity virtually insures rein­
forcement of diversified opinion. *2
piU.S., General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress 
of the United States, Observations on the United States Balance 
of Payments Position (Washington, D.C.: The Comptroller,
General, 19G7), p. 2.22U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Balance- 
of-Paymcnts Statistics of the United States (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 19G5) , p. 2.
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The one balance-of-payments assumption over which there 
is little controversy is the identity of the key factors in the 
equation. Despite the confusion over statistical analysis and 
interpretation, merchandise trade must be indisputably recog­
nized as a crucial factor. Consequently, since 1958, when the 
gravity of the balance-of-payments situation was first con­
fronted, corrective measures have concentrated heavily upon 
foreign trade expansion. This has been demonstrated by the 
proposals and policies of both the Kennedy and Johnson Adminis­
trations. Relying solely upon an aggressive foreign trade ex­
pansion program, however, is ineffective unless coupled with 
supporting domestic import policies.
Domestically, efforts have been made to control infla­
tion, with one of the key battles being fought against the 
United States steel industry. It is interesting to note that 
within the same decade that the steel industry so strongly 
opposed Government interference in regard to price increases, 
the industry has also appealed for Government intervention and 
protection against steel imports. Indeed, the plight of the 
steel industry seems to epitomize the American balance-of- 
payments problem in relation to trade.
Wage disputes and the 1959 steel strike sparked a rise 
of foreign participation in the United States steel markets in 
the 1960Ts. In each subsequent threat of labor-management 
difficulties, this trend has been accelerated. Furthermore, 
the increased inflow of steel imports which began in .1959 was
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paralleled by the outflow of grants and loans used to create 
steel mills in underdeveloped countries. Moreover, in the 
postwar period, the United States and various international 
agencies^ have advanced a total of $2,165 billion from 1947 
through 1966, and an additional $900 million has been provided 
by the U.S.S.R., for the construction of steel-producing facil- 
ities worldwide. Some of the American funds to the under­
developed areas may have been granted to prevent the U.S.S.R. 
from doing so. For whatever reason, the effect has been that 
the American steel industry has not maintained its competitive­
ness domestically because of higher prices; in foreign markets, 
it has suffered because of nontariff barriers and preferential 
treatment granted to members of trading blocs; and, finally, 
the proliferation of steel plants has helped to create a world 
surplus of steel products.
Consequently, future markets which would have existed in 
the developing countries have already been reduced for the tra­
ditional steel-exporting countries. To illustrate, the United 
States share of world steel production has decreased from 61 
percent in 1945 to 26 percent in 1966, and, by 1975, is expected 23
23These include the Export Import Bank of Washington, 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World 
Bank), Inter-American Development Bank, the International Finance 
Corporation, and, the Agency for International Development.
^!'u.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, Steel 
Imports, 90th Cong., 1st sess. , 1967, p. 31.
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to have fallen to 21 percent. This is not to indicate that 
total domestic production has decreased. Rather, international 
steel production has increased while the competitive position of 
American steel products in world markets has decreased. The 
factors of lowered competitiveness because of inflation, loss of 
former export markets, overcapacity problems, trading blocs, and 
new and cheaper substitutes are responsible for this deteriora­
tion.
This deterioration has become an increasingly adverse
factor in the balance-of-payments deficit. Of the $2 billion2 6deficit in 1966, steel products represented $0.9 billion.
This is not to imply, however, that if the steel deficit were 
corrected the balance-of-payments deficit would be improved to 
the same extent. While restoration of a net export balance 
in steel trade is desirable, the cost of achieving this must 
also be counted. Should that balance be achieved through a 
sharp cutback in steel imports which would result in an equiv­
alent amount of dollar exports because of retaliation, the bal­
ance of payments obviously would not be improved.
What this situation of the American steel industry does 
indicate, however, is that there is a necessity for establishing 
priorities as well as for balancing interests. Further, it re­
veals the sometimes contradictory policies originated, within the
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, Steel 
Imports, p. 82.
26II)id. , p. 81.
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same Government, the tension between foreign and domestic econ­
omic policy, and the political reverberations of the balance-of- 
payments choices. It also suggests the impossibility of easy 
or quick resolutions because of the variety and magnitude of 
competing choices and interests often embodied in the same 
decisions.
The case of the United States steel industry, therefore, 
demonstrates the connection between foreign and domestic policy 
decisions. Segregation of the two areas appears impossible. 
Neither policies decided by industry nor by Government can be 
implemented in a vacuum. Just as the steel industry has suffered 
because of international conditions partly brought about by its 
own policies, so also may the Government’s balance-of-payments 
policies be crippled by internal conditions and its trade ex­
pansion program be limited.
To be really effective, an aggressive export expansion 
program presupposes some degree of reciprocity. Such recipro­
city may, of course, virtually eliminate any gains in export 
expansion such as occurred in 1968. Nevertheless, the trend in 
the United States, particularly in the 1960Ts, has been toward 
increased liberalization of trade, which tacitly accepts import 
expansion. The development of this trend is reflected in the 
legislative history regarding trade matters.
The Trade Agreements Act of 193M has served as the 
cornerstone of American commercial policy for almost MO years. 
Originated during the Roosevelt Administration as an anti-
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Depression measure designed to open new export markets for
American products, it lias continued through the postwar years
with a number of extensions. American participation in both
the GATT and "Kennedy Round” bargaining has been derived from
27this earlier legislation.
Extensions of this legislation in the 1950Ts produced an 
inherent contradiction. On one hand, the legislation had en­
couraged continued multilateral tariff reductions on American 
imports. On the other hand, certain provisions of the Act off­
set this liberalization trend. For instance, the "no injury" 
philosophy was incorporated in the national security provisions, 
peril point, and escape clauses of the Act. This philosophy 
allowed for trade expansion through liberalization only so long 
as domestic industry was not adversely affected.
Under such provisions, an industry, very narrowly de­
fined, could claim serious injury based solely on a decline in 
its particular share of the market, despite industry’s overall 
condition. In other words, while Industrial production and em­
ployment might have been increasing, a very small segment claim­
ing injury could theoretically bring about tariff increases, 
should its claims be accepted by the Tariff Commission and the 
President. Until 1958, the President hod final decision-making 
authority over Tariff Commission recommendations. At that time, 27
27Mordechoi E. Kreinin, Alternative Commercial Policies-- 
Their Effect on the American Economy (East Lansing, Michigan: 
Michigan State University International Business and Economic 
Studies, 1967), p. 15.
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however, an extension to the Act stipulated that a two-thirds 
majority of both Houses of Congress could override the Presi­
dent’s decision. As part of the same extension, the President
28was authorized to offer increased concessions.
This latter option of granting concessions has been
utilized to a far greater extent than the escape clause or other 
29provisions. Perhaps more significant than usage of these 
provisions, however, was the inhibitive effect of their exis­
tence. In essence, their purpose was incompatible with eco­
nomic goals despite their limited usage. Consequently, a rec­
onciliation of these incompatible objectives was begun in the 
1962 extension. By the inclusion of a trade adjustment program 
in that extension, a shift in emphasis seems to be denoted. This 
shift was from protection of domestic products against import 
competition to provision for assistance in various forms, (e.g., 
low-interest loans, aid in research, market information), to 
enable a transfer to more competitive market areas. This change 
in emphasis has been further noted in the continuation of the 
’’Kennedy Round” negotiations. 28
28Passage of this legislation followed extensive hearings. 
See U.S., Congress, House, Renewal of Trade Agreements Act, 
Hearings, before the Committee on Ways and Means, 85th Cong., 2nd 
sess. , 1958 and U.S., Congress, Senate, Trade Agreements Act 
Extension., Hearings, before the Committee on Finance, 85th Cong., 
2nd sess., 1958.
2QA thorough discussion of this point is contained in 
Irving Kravis, "Trade Agreement Escape Clause,” American Economic 
Review, XLIV (June, 195M), pp. 319-38.
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A number of interpretations of the post-World War II 
trend toward trade liberalization have been offered. Whatever 
motivation or combination of motives is used to explain this 
trend, the same elements are present while only the emphasis is 
changed. Emerging from World War II as a world power politi­
cally, economically, and militarily, the United States has 
attempted to maintain this position through a number of political 
alliances guaranteed by military force. Consequently, it has 
been argued that political or military rather than economic
considerations have determined American commercial policy during
q nmuch of the postwar period. u
This contention is supported by American support of or­
ganizations such as the European Economic Community (EEC), which 
would affect American exports unfavorably, especially agricul­
tural products. Furthermore, American bargaining power would be 
reduced in international economic negotiations. These consid­
erations, however, were overshadowed by the political advantages 
of a strong Western Europe in Cold War politics. This viewpoint 
interprets American advocacy of the United Kingdom’s entry into 
the EEC as a desire to both strengthen the organization and 
America’s influence on it. American opposition to the creation 
of an all-European Free Trade Area (EFTA) as well as to the 
entry of neutral countries such as Sweden, Austria, and *
^This argument is presented by Bela Balassa, Trade 
Liborali/at ion in Industrial Countries: Objectives and Alter-
nat:ivos (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1905 ) .
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Switzerland into the EEC demonstrated the same point. Without 
political advantages, trading blocs held little American interest.
This attitude seems to have changed in the 1960Ts, when
economic considerations began to equal political ones with the
continuing balance-of-payments problem. This transformation of
United States policies is attributed to the increasing political
strength of the EEC and the erosion of American leadership among
32Western European nations. The EEC has developed into a strong 
bargaining force in GATT negotiations whose market policies cer­
tainly affect American exports. Therefore, the trend of in­
creased trade liberalization in American economic policy, partic­
ularly during the 1960’s, seems to be the result of political as 
well as economic necessity.
In contrast, another key factor in the balance-of-payments 
equation has moved in the opposite direction. If foreign trade 
continues to increase and its attendant legislation has become 
more liberalized, foreign aid has experienced a setback through 
Congressional reductions of requested funds and restrictions in 
legislation. The observation has been made that acceptance and 
support of foreign policy by the American people is prefigured 
by a commitment to moral principle and by a belief that national 31
31Kr einin, Alternative Commercial Polleles--Thelr Effect 
on the American Economy, pp. 12-13.
32 Ibid., p. 19.
security interests are at stake. Both these elements were 
present in the initiation of the foreign aid program. National 
security interests concerned the phenomenal spread of Communism 
in Europe and Asia in the early postwar period. Between 19M5 and 
1950, the spread of Communism subjugated some 19 nations covering 
over 5 million square miles and including more than 700 million
O (Ipeople. In addition, the Soviet Union and Communist China
came to control the world’s largest collection of men and arms, 
while also possessing nuclear weapons as well as large quantities 
of raw materials. The second concern, or commitment to moral 
principle, related to the ideals and freedoms embodied in the 
American Constitution. These have been assured by the economic
*3 Csuccess of the world’s highest per capita nation. 3 Dedication 
to these principles and their preservation, as supplemented by 
economic experience has justified a foreign aid program.
Since its initiation, however, a modification of attitude 
seems to have occurred. While the foreign aid program has not 
been terminated nor has a date for termination been projected, 
the intensity of commitment to a long-range involvement seems to 
have diminished. Initially the product of political and military 
concerns, foreign aid in the 1960’s felt the impact of economic
33Walter W. Rostow, quoted in Robert W. Tucker, Nation 
or Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 16.
3'lLloyd D. Black, The Strategy of Foreign Aid (Princeton, 
N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1968), p. 15.
33
1 ’Ibid, pp. 20-21.
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repercussions. Concurrently, the program in its entirety has 
been brought into question.
This modification of attitude is best demonstrated by 
briefly tracing the legislative history of foreign aid. The 
foreign aid program may be traced as far back as 1938 to the 
Department of State’s educational exchange program with Latin 
America, in some respects the forerunner of the Alliance for 
Progress. Following this was the pre-World War II enactment of 
the Lend Lease Act which provided assistance to potential allies. 
After the war, relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and re­
covery took precedence, and the International Bank for Recon­
struction and Development was established in 1999-, the Marshall 
Plan was begun in 1997, and the British and French Government
Q Caid organizations were set up in 199-6.
With the diminished armies of the United States and 
Western Europe and the growing awareness of the Russian menace, 
aid to Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan gave rise to the 
Truman Doctrine, which was later expanded to include Korea and 
other peripheral areas of China. In 1999, the North Atlantic 
Treaty was signed and the Mutual Defense Assistance program was 
passed by Congress. This legislation authorized assistance for 
the collective security agreements, such as the Rio Pact, NATO, 
SEATO, and other bilateral treaties. Subsequently, special eco­
nomic aid programs were applied to Yugoslavia, Jordan, India, 
Spain, and to Arab and Israeli refugees.
36,Friedmann. International F inancial Aid, p. 2.
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The technical cooperation program, commonly known as 
"Point Four”, was also introduced in 1949, and was passed by 
Congress in 1950 as the Act for International Development,
Title IV of Public Law 535. One interesting aspect of this Act 
was that it stressed the importance of private investment abroad 
and the creation of a favorable climate for such investment. 
Failure to achieve this has had an effect on the balance-of- 
payments problem, and is frequently mentioned as one means of 
improving that situation.
Following the initial appropriations of $39.5 million 
for fiscal year 1951 and $159.5 million for fiscal year 1952 
under "Point Four,"^ the Korean War sparked a renewed effort 
for strengthening all fronts. The result was passage of the 
1951 Mutual Security Act which consolidated the European Co­
operation Administration, the Mutual Assistance Defense Program, 
and "Point Four" efforts. As a result, the former emphasis on 
the building of economic strength by the European Cooperation 
Administration was shifted to defense support under the Mutual 
Security Act.
During the 1950Ts, other instruments for administration 
were created. The most important and enduring one, however, 
was the Agency for International Development (AID), created by 
the Foreign Aid Assistance Act of 1961. Both the Agency and the 
Act continued to control the foreign aid program throughout the 
1960’s.
J‘ B1 nek, The Strategy of Foreign Aid, p . 6.
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Since its beginning, therefore, foreign aid has under­
gone a series of changes. Beginning with victory in war, it has 
passed through reconstruction and economic recovery, to defense 
support and military aid, and, finally, to long-range economic 
development. This latter development has been reinforced by the 
creation of international agencies and special United Nations 
programs.Significance at the national level is attested to 
by the more than $100 billion made available for foreign aid 
programs between 1958 and 1968.^
Although it has been the leading contributor in inter­
national efforts through the mechanisms of the United Nations, 
the United States has preferred bilateral foreign aid programs. 
This preference has been explained on the basis of self-interest 
and security considerations. As a matter of self-interest, the 
United States has not participated solely in a multilateral 
program administered by an international mechanism because its 
role would be both obscured and minimized. Under such a plan, 
the influence of the donor country would be undercut in the 
actual administration of the program and in the decision-making 
process within the United Nations. This is true since relatively 
few countries participate in aid programs, and the United States 3
3 8These special programs include designation of the 
1900’s as the "Decade of Development" and 19G5 as International 
Cooperation Year, the World Food Program and Freedom from Hunger 
Campaign, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
and population conferences.
^Black, The Strategy of Foreign Aid, p. 13.
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is foremost among them. Consequently, the viewpoints and 
attitudes of the recipient countries would far outweigh those 
of the donor countries. Furthermore, all member countries of 
the United Nations would participate in policy determination.
This could present a security threat for included among these 
would be Iron Curtain countries, neutrals, and other uncommitted 
areas. Such circumstances would most likely bring about re­
gional log rolling and could reduce overall effectiveness and
hamper program objectives. In addition, the possibility of a
90Soviet veto would be of continuous concern. For these reasons, 
the decision as to how and for what purposes foreign aid would 
be allocated has been retained at the national level.
This preference, therefore, seems to be the result of 
the political considerations at the base of the program. Begun 
as a blend of Cold War strategy and humanitarian sentiment, 
direct control was placed under domestic rather than interna­
tional authority. The title of the 1999 program, the Mutual 
Security Administration, which raised foreign aid to the level 
of foreign policy, hinted at the direction foreign aid would take
Through the 1950Ts, foreign aid seems to have been di­
rected toward short-range Cold War objectives, with develop­
ment playing a supporting role. Zealous presentations to Con­
gress were phrased to fan the anti-Communist fervor of the time.
90Morris Watnick, "The Appeal of Communism to the Under­
developed Peoples," The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas, ed. by 
Berthold F. Iloselitz (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1952), p. 201.
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Primary emphasis, therefore, seems to have been on stopping the 
spread of Communism, rather than promoting economic development. 
Consequently, military aid appears to have been primary during 
that period. Since the two forms of aid were not separated, 
difficulty has been encountered in distinguishing between them.
In spite of this difficulty, a few analysts have suc­
ceeded in separating the two forms of aid. Among them is John 
Nuveen, who has made an analysis of foreign assistance from 
July of 1995 through March of 1961. His findings indicate that 
of the total appropriations granted to developing countries 
($39.3 billion), $27.1 billion was spent on military assistance 
and defense support, while another $1.9 billion was used for 
administration, international agencies, and miscellaneous 
items.^ Therefore, the conclusion drawn is that criticisms 
alleging excessive waste and poor results should not be attri­
buted solely to economic development programs, which, until the 
19607s, represented a very small percentage of the entire pro­
gram. Nevertheless, it would seem that critics of the foreign 
aid program have bolstered their case by citing total aid 
appropriations rather than the percentage actually used for 
development purposes.
Criticism has gained momentum through such allegations 
as waste,, inefficiency, and lack of accomplishment, but perhaps
'"\john Nuveen, quoted in Friedmann, International 
Financial Aid, p. 385.
Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign A id, pp. 7-8.
1G0
more important is the reduced threat posed by the Soviet Union 
in relation to the Third World. While justification for mili­
tary defense support rested upon the Soviet menace, likewise 
economic development assistance has cited Russia as its cause.
In an historical sense, "if the Soviet experience teaches any­
thing, it is that it demonstrates ad oculos the formidable dan­
gers inherent in our time in the existence of economic backward- 
ness." Therefore, with Russia as both an object lesson and a 
threat, the conclusion was drawn that advanced countries could 
not afford to be indifferent to economic backwardness. It was 
thought to be in their best interest to provide assistance which, 
in turn, would produce the dividends of world stability and pros­
perity. Unfortunately, however, the attitude has been developing 
that although the assistance has been provided, the profits have 
not accrued. The dilemma, then, is seen as the tension between 
long-range objectives and short-term investments.
The fact that in the postwar era all the serious threats
to world peace, with the exceptions of Berlin and Czechoslovakia,
have originated in the Third World has supported arguments favor-
1+1+ing this economic assistance. The shift in emphasis began in
L)3Alexander Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness in 
Historical Perspective," in The Progress of Underdeveloped 
Areas, ed. by Berthold F. Hoselitz (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1952), p. 29.
1|L*Henry Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign 
Policy," Agenda for the Nation, ed. by Kermit Gordon (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institute, 19G8), p. GG3.
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1957, and by fiscal year 1969 almost 80 percent of the economic 
aid funds were directed toward economic development.11'’ More­
over, the verbal willingness of the Soviet bloc not only to 
participate in bilateral aid programs but to significantly in­
crease trade with the developing countries further strengthened 
the American commitment in the 1950Ts and early 1960’s.
However, this intention has not been fulfilled. Two 
reports demonstrate this, one prepared by Soviet market re­
searchers and one prepared by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development. Both reveal greater amounts and superior 
programs of Western economic aid over that of the Eastern bloc, 
and a comparison between the areas regarding trade shows that 
the West accounted for 90 percent and the Eastern bloc for about 
10 percent.+D Moreover, the Soviet bloc has not substantially 
increased its trade with the developing countries in the period
from 1963 through 1967. This factor largely undercut the threat
97of the Soviet prediction of doubling such trade by 1970. Fur­
thermore, Soviet loans to the underdeveloped areas are used to 
pay for equipment and materials purchased in the Soviet bloc. 
Between 1959 and mid-1969, Eastern bloc aid amounted only to
■’Friedmann, International Financial Aid, p. 386.
'̂ JKurt Muller, The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet 
Bloc and Communist China, trans. by Richard H. Weber and Michael 
Roloff (N.Y.: Walker and Company, 1967), p. 193.
'l7Ib:id. , p. 196.
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about $6 billion,1'̂  an amount considerably below that of American 
expenditures. In combination, these elements have served to 
minimize the Communist threat and competition for influence in 
the underdeveloped countries through trade and aid measures in 
the 1960's.
With the diminished threat of Communist global expan­
sion, emphasis shifted to long-term development assistance. 
However, in the meantime, other political and economic concerns 
had emerged. Since 1950, a deficit had existed in the balance 
of payments. Lack of immediate confrontation took into account 
the 1999 currency devaluations, the Korean War, the sharp rise 
of military expenditures abroad, and the fall in exports in 
1953. By this time, Western Europe was beginning to meet its 
domestic needs and the end of the Korean boom was being felt in 
the non-industrial countries.
Furthermore, a new pattern was set in 1953, which was 
also an election year. The Administration proposed $7.9 billion 
for foreign assistance funds, which was less than the $8.5 bil­
lion requested in 1952 but more than the $7.3 billion that Con­
gress had appropriated.1̂  Therefore, the precedent was set
M8Muller, The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc 
and Communist China, p. 219.
99Andrew Westwood, Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy 
Framework (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1966), 
p. 37.
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whereby the Administration could both claim a reduction and con­
currently request an increase.50 Moreover, while these reduc­
tions were largely made in military assistance funds for NATO, 
military assistance funds for Asia were increased. The purpose 
of this increase was to give relief to Korea and to defray French 
costs in Indochina.
The downward trend in Congressional appropriations con­
tinued until 195M-, when a Democratic Congress approved $7.5 bil­
lion out of $7.5 billion requested, which was considered a vic­
tory for the Administration.50- Concurrently, the Administration 
proposed funds be made available for a three-year period to 
finance economic development projects in Asia. Breaking with the 
past procedure of authorizing temporary aid on a yearly basis, 
Congress accepted the proposal of a three-year Development Loan 
Fund. However, in 1957, this was reduced to two years and, 
when a similar authorization for military assistance was sought, 
it was denied until 1960.
With the shift in emphasis to long-term development, a 
stabilizing effect seems to have taken place in funding. For 
1957, 1958, and 1959, Administration proposals requested $3.9 *5
50For illustration, see U.S., Congress, Senate, Com­
parison of Budget Requests and Appropriations for the Aid Pro­
gram, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 196b, p. b72.
5 1Westwood, Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework,
p. 58.
billion, while the appropriations were slightly l o w e r . D u r i n g  
this period, however, expansion of funds for development lending 
did not have strong support because of the deepening concern over 
the balance-of-payments deficit. Although the Suez crisis pro­
vided a $500 million surplus in 1957, this was the only surplus 
since 1999. Recognition occurred with the $3.5 billion deficit 
of 1958, $3.7 billion of 1959, and $3.9 billion of 1960. After 
this, the amount declined somewhat to $2.9 billion in 1961 and 
$2.2 billion in 1962.-^ At that time, from 1958 through 1960, 
however, neither Congress nor the Administration seem to have 
wanted greater emphasis placed on long-term foreign aid expendi­
tures and, consequently, development lending outside the foreign 
aid program was emphasized. This has been done in conjunction 
with the "tied-aid” concept introduced in 1959.
In 1960, Congress authorized long-term military assis­
tance. By this action, annual military funding would need ap­
proval but the legislation would be continuous. Also in 1960, 
the United States made the proposal that a Development Assistance 
Group become a part of the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation, which subsequently became the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
52U.S.f President, Foreign Aid Message of March 22, 1961 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961),
53U.S., President, Special Message on the Balance of 




This group was not intended to be a fund or source of economic 
aid, but rather a consultative and coordinative body. Its over­
all effect seems to have been as a pressure group for increasing 
foreign aid funds.
New legislation, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, re­
placed the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and a reorganization of 
the aid agency took place. It has since been called the Agency 
for International Development. This action was taken to present 
a "new look" to the foreign aid p r o g r a m . T h e  substantive 
change was concentration upon long-term development lending to 
coincide with the United Nations "Decade of Development." In 
addition, the Administration stated that aid for crisis situa­
tions, such as Vietnam, would have to continue until resolved 
and also requested a crash Latin American aid bill.~^
Ineffectiveness of the reorganization, recurrence of 
familiar problems, plus the pressure of a persistent balance-of- 
payments problem, may account for the 1962 reduction in foreign 
aid. This action prefigured subsequent cuts and reflected the 
growing difference between Congressional authorization and Ad­
ministration requests for foreign aid appropriations. For fiscal 
year 1963, the Administration's foreign aid requests were reduced
59U.S., President, Foreign Aid Message of March 22, 1961,
p. b.
"’"’u.S. , President, Budget of the United States Govern­
ment FY 1962: Budget Message and Summary Budget Statement 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 1-5.
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by 25 percent, or $1,12|4 million, by Congress/ The following 
year, partly as a result of the Clay Committee findings (see 
p. 62), Administration requests for fiscal year I960 were reduced 
from $l+.5 billion to $3.6 billion.^
These reductions were indicative of the trend for the 
remainder of the decade. Through the second half of the 1960’s, 
foreign aid expenditures have not received the priority status 
of their earlier years. On one hand, the volume for development 
has leveled off rather than increased in proportion to either 
the American gross national product or the estimated needs of 
the recipient countries. On the other hand, the costs of ad­
ministering the program have risen. Furthermore, Congressional 
debates seem to have become more bitter and divisive and have 
resulted in such measures as ceilings on the number of countries 
receiving certain kinds of aid, eligibility restrictions, and 
loans replacing grants on a large scale. For instance, from 
1953 through 1955, loans represented 6 percent of the total aid 
assistance; from 1959 through 1961, 36 percent; and, in 1965,
60 percent of the total assistance to all countries other than
58Vietnam was in the form of loans.
S 6
U.S., Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance and Related 
Agencies Appropriations for 1963, Hearings, before the Committee 
on Appropriations, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., 1962, p. 733.
57U.S., Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance and Related 
Agencies Appropriations for 1969, Hearings, before the Committee 
on Appropriations, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, p. 289.
58Agency for International Development, Summary Report 
on Loan Terms, Debt burden, and Development (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 2.
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Furthermore, loan terms have hardened and "tied aid" 
requirements are extensively used. Moreover, the share of aid 
funds devoted to Vietnam has overshadowed and undercut the amount 
devoted to the remainder of the underdeveloped countries. On an 
international level, the amount of aid contributed through inter­
national agencies rose slightly. However, the American bilateral 
program continued to be unmatched by any other nation.
While the American program has continued to lead all 
foreign aid programs, continuity is also seen in the criticism 
generated within the country. Although its advocates have accen­
tuated positive effects, the adversaries of the foreign aid pro­
gram have found much to discredit. Among the continuing criti­
cisms is the effect on the balance of payments. The similarity 
between the amount of the deficit and foreign aid appropriations 
is striking. Again, however, conclusions relate to the particular 
statistics chosen. In any case, a relationship does exist and 
more often than not it has been described as detrimental in an 
economic sense.
Spokesmen for the foreign aid program, on the other hand, 
have offered a different interpretation. In relation to the 
largest single foreign aid expenditure, to Vietnam, President 
Johnson conceded that a cessation of the fighting would reduce 
the approximate $1.5 billion annual exchange costs and help the 
balance-of-payments problem. However, he also stressed that 
"America had a balance-of-payments problem before Vietnam and
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cessation of the fighting will not in and of itself effect a 
59cure." While it should free funds for other international
areas or for domestic programs, several years may be required
60to accomplish this diversion of funds.
In a similar vein, the argument has been made by AID’s
Administrator, Mr. William S. Gaud, that AIDTs contribution to
61the dollar drain in mid-1968 "had been cut to nothing." At 
the same time, however, so had its contribution to international 
trade expansion. The Agency’s claim of a reduction to the 
dollar drain was based on a comparison between fiscal year 1961, 
when AID’s overseas expenditures totaled $982 million, and fiscal 
year 1968, when this outflow was $178 million. Interest and pay­
ments on previous loans totaling $259 million offset this out-
6 2flow and resulted in a net inflow of $81 million. Despite inter­
national trade expansion considerations, the reduced outflow of 
funds might have been significant. It is indeed unfortunate that 
this occurred the same year that President Johnson’s export ex­
pansion gains were obliterated by the large import increase. *6
59President Lyndon Johnson, quoted in U.S., Treasury De- 
partment, Maintaining the Strength of the United States Dollar in 
a Strong Free World Economy (Washington, D.C.: Government Print­
ing Office, 1968), p. 2.
6 0Charles L. Schultze, "Budget Alternatives after Vietnam," 
in Agenda for the Nation, ed. by Kermit Gordon (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institute, 1968), p. 38.
61William S. Gaud, quoted in U.S., Congress, Joint Eco­
nomic Committee, Foreign Aid hearings, before the subcommittee on 




Nevertheless, the AID program claims to have moved from 
a negative to a positive impact on the American balance of pay­
ments, and to take credit for "stanching the direct outflow in
any given year is the tying of procurement to United States 
6 3sources." Thus, the continuation of "tied aid" for balance- 
of-payments reasons has strong justification despite its seem­
ingly unjust effect on recipient countries, i.e., while relieving 
American balance-of-payments problems, it offers no corres­
ponding relief for the balance-of-payments problems in the re­
cipient countries.
While the Agency anticipates an increase in the inflow
of funds in the future, others suggest the increasing difficulty
of the developing countries to make such payments. Although it
varies among countries, this growing debt burden is cited as a
6breal problem for the 1970’s. Moreover, these countries as an 
aggregate are unable to finance large deficits for more than a 
few years because of an insufficient share of the world’s re­
serves. Neither are they able to earn surpluses consistently,
because expansionary desires result in their spending virtually
6 Sall their foreign exchange in foreign markets. Therefore, 
their balance-of-payments problems are at least as critical as 
those of the United States.
^Westwood, Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework,
p. 205.
64Ibid., p. 112.
65Sa1ant, The United States Balance of Payments In 1968,
p. 25.
no
With the critical economic situation in the developing 
countries, the need for additional funds from donor countries 
has been advocated. However, the downward trend in Congressional 
allocation, plus the uncertainty of commitment to a long-range 
American program, has caused another shift in emphasis. This 
shift is toward private investment. While measures have been 
implemented to reduce capital outflow, notably during the Johnson 
Administration, they were not intended to apply to the developing 
countries.^ However, intention and outcome seem not to have 
coincided. Therefore, steps have been taken during the Nixon 
Administration to alleviate these restrictions. Furthermore, 
a continuing commitment to long-range foreign aid has been 
affirmed by the Nixon Administration, relying upon moral, eco­
nomic, and national security considerations.
In presenting the fiscal year 1970 economic and military
assistance program, Mr. Nixon is quoted as saying,
This Administration believes that we have moved well beyond 
the time when the concept of assistance could be related to 
short-term U.S. policy and security interests. Such a view 
misrepresents the nature of the current effort. '
This commitment has been reflected in foreign aid requests to 6
6 0Agency for International Development, Foreign Aid 
Through Private Initiateve: A Report of the Advisory Committee 
on Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1965), pp. 27-28.
G 7President Richard M. Nixon, quoted in "Foreign Aid and 
the United States National Interests," Department of State 
Dulietin, June 30, 1969, p. 1.
Ill
f oCongress with emphasis on private enterprise, technical assis­
tance measures, and multilateral cooperation.^
Moreover, in making the earlier 1968 appropriations, 
which were the smallest since the program began, Congress had 
asked for a reappraisal of foreign assistance programs along 
with recommendations for reform and reorganization. The Nixon 
Administration has consequently created the position of Auditor 
General to assure proper usage of AID funds. Therefore, indica­
tions are that the foreign aid program, despite fluctuations, 
reductions, and severe criticism, is enduring.
Along this same line, the Nixon Administration is moving 
toward a further reorganization of the foreign aid program. The 
technical assistance programs, which total about $270 million 
annually, are expected to be placed under international agencies 
or private contractors insofar as possible.^ This move toward 
increased reliance on multilateral agencies and the private 
sector at the implementation stage is in line with the Adminis­
tration's previously announced policy. Reorganization of the 
foreign aid program as proposed by the Nixon Administration
k^The appropriations requested for FY 1970 were $2.2 bil­
lion for economic assistance, $375 million for military assis­
tance, and $75 million for guaranteed reserves, most of which are 
in the form of repayable loans.
^Robert E. Asher, Development Assistance in the 70's: 
Alternatives for the United States (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institute, 1970), p. 2.
^Bernard D. Nossiter, "U.S. Moves to Reduce AID Role 
Overseas," Washington Post, March 30, 1971, p. 1.
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includes replacing AID by three new agencies, one to handle the 
development loan program, one for military assistance, and one 
for technical aid./J- The question which remains to be settled 
is whether this reduction in supervision and influence, although 
relatively small, will be accepted.
Acceptance of a reduced American role has likewise been 
a problem in reaching agreement in international monetary reform 
negotiations. These negotiations have been necessary because 
the American dollar crisis is not solely an American problem. 
Beyond 1958, continued American deficits have been interpreted 
as a threat to the international monetary order, since they seem 
to represent a genuine balance-of-payments disequilibrium. Con­
sequently, the argument is repeatedly made that they can neither 
be approved nor sustained.^ a solution, however, is doubly 
difficult because the country having the chronic deficits is, 
at the same time, a key-currency country.
The effects of American economic decisions may, there­
fore, be felt worldwide, since the United States is a key- 
currency country. For instance, should the United States be 
forced by balance-of-payments pressure to either devalue the 
dollar or to impose trade and exchange controls, then the inter­
national monetary system would be jeopardized. While this may
■^Nossiter, ”U.S. Moves to Reduce AID Role Overseas,” 
Washington Post, March 30, 1971, p. 1.
7 n'Delbert A. Snider, International Monetary Relations 
(New York: Random House, 1906), p. 110.
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be a remote possibility from an American viewpoint, nevertheless, 
the American balance-of-payments problem has not been effectively 
removed through American policy decisions. Moreover, the prob­
lem is multiplied by the dual role in which the United States 
has found itself.
Although the dollar crisis of the past decade appears to 
have been met by general cooperation among the major governments 
of the world and the central banks, this cooperation has resulted 
in only short-term agreements. These agreements have concen­
trated upon warding off a collapse of the entire system similar
73to that which occurred in 1931. Fear of such a collapse rests 
partially upon a contrast between present and previous practices. 
In the past, banks attempted to adjust their rates to the par­
ticular balance-of-payments situation. Therefore, international 
policies deferred to balance-of-payments equilibrium. In con­
trast, present practice often appears to place primary emphasis 
on employment and growth policies.
Disapproval of such practice is based upon fear of de­
valuation of the dollar, which could give rise to massive inter­
national movements of speculative funds, which, in turn, might
79require the creation of special institutions. In short, the 
present structure of the monetary system is thought by many to
73Robert Triffin, Our International Monetary System: 
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (New York: Random House, Inc., 
19G8) , p. 57.
714Fritz Machlup, Plans for Reform of the International 
Monetary System (Princeton, N.J.: Pr inceton University, 19Gll) , 
p. 15.
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be far too susceptible to breakdown. Doubts that the dollar 
liability has limits, supplemented by fear of exceeding that 
limit, has caused further reluctance to accept dollar supplies.
Certainly, such a breakdown could have manifold conse­
quences internationally. More likely, however, improvisation 
could relieve some of the chaos, but, rather than rely on such 
a possibility, experts have offered reform proposals to alleviate 
the potential problems within the current framework. Suggested 
reforms, however, have elicited some fundamental disagreements. 
Different therapies have been advanced regarding the stabiliza­
tion of currencies through a reestablishment of convertibility 
and by a revaluation of the current gold price.
Along with the numerous proposals, there seem to be at 
least as many problems created in the areas of foreign exchange, 
governmental and private finance, central and commercial banking, 
international organization, and even gold mining and production. 
In general, the only point which seems to have claimed a con­
sensus of opinion has been the inadequacy of the present system.
While some experts do not agree that reserve creation 
has been inadequate in the past, the creation of adequate re­
serves for the future is basic to the issue of reform. In this 
respect, there is virtually no support for retention of the 
current system among economists and knowledgeable officials. 
Criticism relates both to the source of additional gold supplies 
on which the system rests, and the method whereby surplus coun­
tries have obtained their additional reserves.
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For instance, in the six-year period from 1960 through 
1965, two-thirds of the gold purchased in Western markets had 
Russia as its source, and three-fourths of the reserve increases 
in Western countries were counter-balanced by the deficits in the 
two reserve-center countries, the United States and Great 
Britain.'7-’ Such a system, it has widely been concluded, is not 
only unsafe but irrational. It is unsafe because it relies on 
a latently hostile government to furnish a sizeable amount of its 
gold supply,^ and it is irrational because of the inequities it 
is producing. Such conditions foster a lack of confidence in 
the overall stability of the system.
Proposed remedies in the 1960Ts, however, have resulted 
in sharply divided opinion between those countries which have a 
deficit, i.e., the United States and the United Kingdom, and 
those which have a surplus, i.e., countries of Continental 
Europe, particularly France. Without discussing the specific 
details of American proposals, the United States has generally 
favored the creation of a new reserve asset. However, such an 
asset would be used only as a supplement to British pounds and 
American dollars should the need arise, i.e., should the usual 
methods of using dollars and pounds to offset the shortage
7 ̂' Triffin, Our International Monetary System, p. 57.
^American antipathy to Russian gold dotes back as far as 
1917, when the Bolsheviks took control of the Russian government. 
For a discussion of the American State Department ruling against 
the acceptance of Russian gold by either the U.S. Mint or assay 
offices, see Robert P. Browder, The Origins of Soviet-American 
Diplomacy (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953),
pp. 26-6 8.
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between gold assets and actual liquidity requirements fail.
The French counter-proposal has also supported the
creation of a new reserve asset, but one which would replace
rather than merely supplement existing currencies. At this
point, the disagreement seems to become more political than
economic. In a 1965 press conference, President Charles
de Gaulle expressed this disagreement when he asked
Why should the two richest countries of the world be allowed 
to monopolize the benefits of international reserve creation 
for the financing of their own deficits? Why should the 
Bank of France be expected to participate--by its purchase 
of dollars--in the financing of U.S. policies in which 
France has no voice and with which she might be in funda­
mental disagreement? Are not United States deficits 
ascribable, at least in part, to the flurry of United 
States private investments abroad (substituting United 
States for French ownership), to United States assistance 
to Chiang Kai-shek, to the escalation of the war in Southeast 
Asia, and so on?^
Therefore, this opinion would visualize joint decisions being 
made for predetermined purposes and, most important, new reserves 
being created to replace and not merely supplement those now in 
use. Predictably enough, there was far less than enthusiastic 
reception of this proposal among American and British authori­
ties.
With the complexity of the problem plus the diversity of 
opinion among the authorities as well as the nations, it is not 
surprising that comprehensive reform has not yet been achieved. 
As recently as 1968, the Conference on International Monetary
77President Charles de Gaulle, quoted in Triffin, Our 
International Monetary System, p. 108.
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Order, one of a number of conferences held during the past few 
years, noted that the "world today faces the most serious mone­
tary crisis of the postwar period . . . and concluded that 
the major factor in these difficulties is persistent inflation 
and the consequent lack of confidence in the currencies."'7̂
One of the essential measures suggested was the summarization of 
problems and remedies "because much of the discussion of this 
subject has been in highly technical and obscure language with 
the result that basic issues have not been understood by the 
general public."'7̂  However, even with wide dissemination of 
the information available, it does not seem likely that radical 
international innovation would take place. Indeed, at the 
bottom of every argument to end the chronic balance-of-payments 
deficits is the issue of domestic inflation, which completes 
and closes the circle.
•7gConference on International Monetary Order: Agenda 
for Action by a Group of Monetary Experts (Geneva: Graduate 




In summary, the post-World War II era marks both a 
period of decline and of development in the economic affairs of 
the United States. In the trade position of the United States, 
a relative decline has occurred. This phenomenon has been 
traced to a variety of causes, including physical or natural, 
domestic policy regarding inflation and interest rates, a long 
line of historical and legal precedents restricting international 
trade relations, and the export of technology. Concurrently, 
the United States has engaged in extensive development activi­
ties through its foreign aid program. Initially intended to 
assist Western European recovery, it has subsequently been 
broadened to meet the Communist challenge, and, later, to pro­
vide assistance for long-range development solely for the sake 
of development.
Relating to both trade and aid policies, the American 
balance-of-payments problem has become a characteristic of the 
postwar era. Within this relationship, it may be divided into 
three periods. The first, from the close of World War II until 
1950, was a political and economic summit for the United States. 
With the devastation of Western Europe, America ascended to 
reign over the Western world economically, politically and
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militarily, while Russia emerged as the Eastern parallel. During 
this time, the wealth of the Western world flowed into the United 
States, production levels could hardly meet international de­
mands, and Western solidarity was a political postulate. The 
emergence of the communist threat was met with almost religious 
fervor, and the thrust of the response was bolstered by a healthy 
and vigorous economy. This economic utopia allowed the initia­
tion of a sizable foreign aid assistance program. Continuation 
of economic eminence seems never to have been doubted in the 
past, but continued commitment to long-range foreign assistance 
appears doubtful in the future.
With the reconstruction and recovery of Western Europe, 
monetary and economic stability followed. Consequently, 1950 
began a new phase during which the ’dollar shortage’ ended and 
a redistribution of international reserves resulted in restora­
tion of more normal patterns. This redistribution continued with 
the tacit approval of the United States Government for several 
years after 1950. At the same time, foreign aid assistance also 
passed through reconstruction and economic recovery. Rather 
than being terminated or reduced when this was accomplished, it 
was instead diverted to other areas in the form of defense sup­
port and military aid. This diversion was justified on the basis 
of the alarming expansion of Communism between 1995 and 1950.
This interpreted threat to national security and democratic 
principles was answered by a substantial outpouring of funds 
which was reflected in the balance of payments as a deficit.
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Until 1958, balance-of-payments deficits were a matter 
of official sanction. Beginning with 1958 and the third period, 
however, concern became rather widespread regarding the con­
tinuation of such a practice. Not only were continued deficits 
posing a threat to the national economy, but also to the inter­
national one. Immediate reduction of these annual deficits 
without abandoning the foreign aid program, an element of foreign 
policy considered vital by some, has created quite a dilemma. 
Despite the fact that a relatively large trade surplus has 
existed in the American balance of payments, it has been insuf­
ficient to meet the expenses of economic and military assistance 
programs. Consequently, several avenues have been explored in 
the hope of alleviating this situation.
Among the attempted remedies have been an expansive ex­
port program, restrictions on the outflow of capital through 
foreign investments, and the use of the ,Ttied-aidn concept in 
the bilateral foreign aid program. Each of these measures has 
been successful up to a point. However, their effectiveness 
seems to have been reduced not so much because there has been 
disagreement and resistance from those feeling themselves ma­
ligned, but more so because these are primarily national mea­
sures. Their results, however, are contingent upon external as 
well as internal policies and situations. Since national policy 
decisions cannot be implemented in a vacuum but are inevitably 
affected by international circumstances, these measures have
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failed to achieve their objective, to transform the United States 
from a debtor to a strong creditor nation.
Similarly, international decisions cannot be effective 
without extensive national cooperation and support. If it is 
necessary to consider foreign economic policies in improving the 
American balance-of-payments situation, it is equally important 
for international agencies realistically to consider the feasi­
bility of their proposals within the individual countries. This 
is particularly so in relation to the United States. Emphasis 
is placed on the United States because it is in the precarious 
position of being both a key-reserve country and a debtor nation. 
Such economic policies have a splintering effect. Any major 
economic policy decision regarding the American balance of 
payments may reverberate throughout the world as well as the 
nation. Moreover, improvement of the balance-of-payments 
situation is further hampered by the restraints of these cir­
cumstances. Being both a key-currency country and sustaining 
a deficit restricts flexibility and timely responses.
In conclusion, the American balanee-of-payments problem 
in the post-World War II era might have been solved rather 
quickly through the application of one or several drastic mea­
sures. However, a national consensus has not emerged to warrant 
such action. It is doubtful that such drastic measures would be 
politically acceptable. In other words, the American attitude 
has been that this is a serious matter but not one of crisis 
proportions. Moreover, there has been a lack of adequate and
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analytical material to explain this complex subject and enlighten 
the American public on the possible remedies.
In short, alternatives have not been widely understood 
within the United States. This does not seem surprising, how­
ever, when the considerable amount of disagreement existing 
among authorities and scholars is taken into account. For this 
same reason, it is not anticipated that comprehensive reform 
will be implemented either nationally or internationally in the 
immediate future. Rather, it is to be expected that the balance - 
of-payments disequilibrium, although diminished, will persist 
until either an international crisis develops or the payments 
problem cures itself over a long period of time. Probably this 
would be over a longer period of time than the United States 
Government has indicated in the past that it is willing to wait.
This latter option of the payments problem curing itself 
seems more likely to be the ultimate resolution to the problem. 
This conclusion relates more to attitude than arithmetic, for in 
the United States primary emphasis centers on a balance of in­
terests rather than of payments. Government necessarily must 
assume the role of mediator between conflicting interests and 
realize some balance of interests. Of the causes deemed re­
sponsible, domestic inflation is cited most often as the crux 
of the chronic balance-of-payments problem. American opinion 
condemns inflation only so long as it is impersonal. When the 
issue becomes personal, and employment, wages, and domestic
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markets shrink, then the predominance of the balance-of-payments 
problem likewise diminishes.
Furthermore, commitment to long-range economic develop­
ment has been repeatedly made by Democratic and Republican 
Administrations alike throughout the I960’s and 1970’s. While 
Congress has expressed no similar commitment as a body and, 
indeed, has reduced Administration requests, it has not been 
inclined to discard its international investment at this point. 
With this internal situation, attention turns to international 
options, which equally require negotiations and an agreeable 
balancing of interests. Liberalized trade, assumption of a 
larger role in foreign aid by surplus nations, and intentional 
measures by surplus countries to assist deficit countries, all 
imply a quid pro quo relationship.
Finally, the choices available are limited and the 
possible repercussions are inhibitive. In making these choices, 
the United States is essentially grappling with a problem at 
least as political as it is economic. These choices are neither 
abstractions nor impersonal, for they affect all Americans very 
personally. In this complex arena of overlapping domestic and 
foreign policy, no panacea lias emerged, nor is one expected. 
Rather, it seems more likely that United States economic policy 
will continue to respond cautiously and appear to do no more than 
'muddle through.’ Given the context and magnitude of the prob­
lem, however, this possibility does not seem to be overly per­
plexing or altogether undesirable.
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Since World War II, the American balance-of-payments 
situation has presented a multifaceted problem. This study is 
an attempt to show some of the interrelated and overlapping 
political, economic, military and diplomatic aspects of this 
problem. Of the key factors involved, international trade and 
foreign aid programs have been of primary significance. Pro­
posed solutions, however, have reflected highly diverse opinion 
on both the national and international levels.
No immediate resolution to the problem has emerged, 
partly because of the democratic system of government in the 
United States and partly because of the limited reforms which 
have been agreed to in the international monetary system. It 
is not expected that this problem will be solved easily or 
quickly for two reasons. First, the failure to curb adequately 
domestic inflation has reduced American competitiveness in
1
world markets, and, secondly, a continuing commitment to the 
foreign aid program has been made.
Finally, recurring crises in the future are a very real 
possibility. Given the complexity of the problem, however, 
careful deliberation and experimentation seem warranted even at 
the expense of immediate resolution.
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